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Rethinking Technology Neutrality 
Brad A. Greenberg† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Should laws be technology specific or technology neutral? 
That is, should laws be drawn narrowly to specific technologies 
or broadly to general characteristics? Scholars and legislators 
have overwhelmingly adopted the latter mode—“technology 
neutrality”—based on the assumption it promotes statutory 
longevity and equal treatment of old and new technologies. But 
technology neutrality suffers from inherent flaws that under-
mine its ability to achieve these policy goals. Neutrality, it 
turns out, is both suboptimal and often self-defeating. It is also 
not neutral. 
Four fraught decades in copyright law, during which tech-
nology neutrality was supposed to mitigate a perennial struggle 
of adapting copyright to new communications technologies, re-
veal fundamental failings. With the 1976 Copyright Act,1 a 
Congress weary of recurring demands to revise copyright law in 
light of new technologies—e.g., phonographs, film, radio, cable 
 
†  Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School; Coun-
sel, U.S. Copyright Office. I largely completed this project as an Intellectual 
Property Fellow at the Kernochan Center for Law, Media & the Arts at Co-
lumbia Law School. For helpful feedback, I thank BJ Ard, Jack Balkin, Derek 
Bambauer, Michael Birnhack, Bruce Boyden, Sam Bray, Kiel Brennan-
Marquez, Dan Burk, Peter DiCola, Susy Frankel, Kristelia Garcia, Jane Gins-
burg, James Grimmelmann, Steve Horowitz, Margot Kaminski, Mark Lemley, 
Yafit Lev-Aretz, Doug Lichtman, Jake Linford, Peter Menell, Tejas 
Narechania, Neil Netanel, Lisa Ouellette, David Pozen, Harry Surden, Mat-
thew Sag, David Thaw, Felix Wu, and Tim Wu, as well as participants in the 
2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2014 Internet Law Works-
in-Progress, the 2014 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property, the 2015 Van-
derbilt IP Scholars Roundtable and the fellows workshops at Columbia and 
Yale. This Article represents my personal opinions and does not reflect an offi-
cial or unofficial position of the U.S. Copyright Office. Copyright © 2016 by 
Brad A. Greenberg. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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transmission, etc.—thought it had guarded the statute against 
ossification and obsolescence via technology-neutral defaults. 
These defaults appear in the 1976 Act’s provisions on subject 
matter,2 rights,3 and statutory definitions.4 Copyright control 
was thus supposed to turn on relevant circumstances, not tech-
nicalities. That is, with the exception of numerous technology-
specific carveouts,5 copyright’s subject matter and scope would 
apply broadly and evenly to all technologies, even those that 
did not exist. Copyright law would be technology neutral. 
Yet, disputes continue. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether a retransmission company, 
Aereo, violated copyright law by trying to invent around the 
broadcasters’ public performance rights.6 American Broadcast-
ing Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. was the twelfth Supreme 
Court copyright case arising from a dispute over a new technol-
ogy or new use of an existing technology;7 technology-driven 
cases have constituted twenty percent of the Court’s substan-
tive copyright docket since 1978.8 
 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 3. Id. § 106. 
 4. Id. § 101. 
 5. For a discussion of some of the many technology-specific provisions 
that are the exceptions to the Copyright Act’s technology-neutral defaults and 
that have increased over time, see infra Part I.B. 
 6. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 7. See generally MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) 
(peer-to-peer file sharing); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (elec-
tronic reproductions); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 
(1996) (software); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (home video recorders); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 
420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopying); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (cable retransmission); Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (same); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201 (1954) (applied art); Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 
(1931) (radio); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (motion picture 
version of novel Ben Hur); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908) (player piano rolls); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 
111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs). Although Mazer is not typically thought of 
as a new technology case, it is relevant because it involved a new use of an ex-
isting technology. 
 8. I set January 1, 1978, as the cutoff because that is when the 1976 
Copyright Act took effect. This also excludes any case that did not arise pri-
marily as a copyright dispute. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Of the 
Court’s twenty copyright cases, four were primarily driven by new technolo-
gies. 
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The need to adapt to new technologies remains the primary 
impetus for copyright revision. The 1976 Act, like its predeces-
sors, began to feel antiquated shortly after its enactment—“a 
good 1950 copyright law,” in the words of the statute’s principle 
drafter, former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer.9 Tech-
nology-neutral provisions have failed to future-proof copyright 
law, leading to numerous quickly outmoded revisions. Neutral 
provisions also have magnified copyright’s complexity by driv-
ing judicial inconsistency and increasing the role of uncertain 
ex post exceptions. And, repeatedly, technology-neutral provi-
sions have been neutral in theory, but technology-specific in 
practice; by focusing on design,10 judges have reached contrary 
results across technologies that are similar in technological 
output but distinct in design, process, or construct.11 Moreover, 
the 1976 Act’s technology-neutral defaults were drafted with 
existing technologies (and business models) in mind, resulting 
in inefficient and unjustified discrimination against new tech-
nologies. 
Surprisingly, scholars have not questioned the expedience 
of technology neutrality as embodied by the 1976 Copyright 
Act. With the review process ongoing for possibly the fifth ma-
jor overhaul of copyright law,12 copyright scholars, at confer-
ences and before Congress, have highlighted numerous areas of 
the law that they think are in greatest need of reform.13 Yet, 
 
 9. Barbara Ringer, Authors’ Rights in the Electronic Age: Beyond the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 1 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981); see also id. 
(“[S]ome of its inadequacies are already becoming apparent, and no prophet is 
needed to foretell the need for substantial restructuring of our copyright sys-
tem before the end of this century.”).  
 10. And, in this sense, adopting the formalistic approach of White-Smith 
Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 1. 
 11. In other words, judges apply different doctrines to different technolo-
gies that do the same thing because the technologies use different means to 
achieve the same end. See, e.g., infra notes 208–25 and accompanying text 
(discussing the three big peer-to-peer file-sharing cases from the early aughts). 
 12. See The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. (2014); see also Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 
36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013) (an extended version of the Twenty-Sixth 
Horace S. Manges Lecture delivered on March 4, 2013, at Columbia Law 
School, in which the Register of Copyrights called on Congress to review and 
revise the copyright law). Four previous major revisions were implemented by 
the 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976 copyright statutes. 
 13. Among other issues, statutory damages, notice and takedown, orphan 
works, music licensing, the scope of rights, formalities, and copyright limita-
tions have received significant attention. See, e.g., Congressional Hearings on 
the Review of the Copyright Law, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://copyright 
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despite generally broad recognition that copyright law remains 
poorly tailored to new technologies, scholars have not searched 
Congress’s rationale for adopting technology-neutral provisions 
in copyright nor asked whether and when neutrality is desira-
ble or even achievable. 
This Article offers a novel critique of technology neutrality. 
It starts from the premise that technology neutrality is under-
theorized and, thereby, poorly understood. While scholars fre-
quently refer vaguely to the principle, few have conceptualized 
it, and legislators have adopted it without critical inquiry. This 
Article challenges the utility of technology neutrality by posit-
ing four overlooked flaws: (1) the problem of prediction; (2) the 
problem of the penumbra; (3) the problem of perspective; and 
(4) the problem of pretense. Together, these problems demon-
strate that technology neutrality is both suboptimal and often 
self-defeating—the very features that are said to animate its 
virtues also expose vices that impede the ability to achieve 
stated policy goals. In contrast, technological discrimination 
sometimes enhances social welfare. 
First, this Article introduces technology neutrality’s prob-
lem of prediction. That is, legislators often cannot adequately 
predict whether and to what extent a law should regulate a 
new technology until that technology is known. Because laws 
drafted to account for unforeseen technologies are, in fact, 
drawn with known technologies in mind, they are prone to poor 
tailoring. These predictive limitations undermine technology 
neutrality’s ability to future-proof laws against paradigm-
shifting technologies and mistake equal application for equiva-
lence. The emergence of the Internet offers a poignant illustra-
tion of this tension in the 1976 Copyright Act. 
Second, and relatedly, this Article explains how technology 
neutrality amplifies a general challenge of jurisprudence—the 
problem of the penumbra—and how this leads to under- and 
over-inclusiveness. Legal theorists like H.L.A. Hart long have 
recognized the limitations in tailoring a law to unforeseen cir-
cumstances.14 Yet, surprisingly, these understandings have not 
colored the principle of technology neutrality, which is under-
mined by an enlarging penumbra of uncertainty. Moreover, 
 
.gov/laws/hearings (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); Patrick Goold, The Next Great 
Copyright Act—A Conference Recap, TECH. ACAD. POL’Y (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/May-2014/Next-Great-Copyright-Act-–-A-
Conference-Recap,-The.aspx.  
 14. See infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
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with time it becomes less clear that the law should apply, and 
because the 1976 Act uses broad terms that are per se inclusive 
of new technologies, courts have responded by expanding the 
availability of use-specific exceptions to copyright liability. In 
particular, fair use has taken on an outsized role. That, in turn, 
has increased uncertainty about how the law actually will be 
applied. 
Third, this Article explores the problem of perspective in 
copyright law that misguides technology-neutral inquiries. 
Even assuming that technology neutrality is desirable, its im-
plementation is hampered by judges choosing between a behav-
ioral perspective and a structural perspective in infringement 
inquiries. The former focuses on the technological output, the 
use facilitated by the technology; the latter looks inside the ma-
chine at the design or process that enables the use. Numerous 
examples from recent decades show that the locus of inquiry of-
ten is determinative, with variations leading to inconsistent 
application of copyright law.15 
And, fourth, this Article discusses the problem of pre-
tense—that technology neutrality is not, in fact, neutral. To 
begin, legislative and interpretive processes are shaped by so-
cial and political contexts. Merely determining the technologies 
to which the law should be applied neutrally is based on value 
judgments that reflect different beliefs about the law’s role in 
protecting authors or enabling technology. Moreover, ex ante 
inclusion of unforeseen technologies increases the likelihood 
that the law will discriminate against future technologies by 
not accounting for new uses that disturb the policies Congress 
previously balanced. 
This conceptual rethinking reveals fundamental flaws with 
the ex ante application of law to future technologies. Technolo-
 
 15. Yet the problem of perspective has a much longer history in copyright 
law. Part II.C focuses specifically on Aereo and peer-to-peer file-sharing. But 
other examples exist, such as video game derivative works. Compare Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967–68 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s Game Genie, which enabled users to alter Ninten-
do video games while the game was in use, did not infringe Nintendo’s copy-
rights because the “altered displays do not incorporate a portion of a copy-
righted work in some concrete or permanent form,” and the changes do not 
exist independent of the Nintendo console), with Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic 
Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013–14 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that read-only 
memory chips that replaced a video game manufacturer’s circuit boards and 
increased rate of game play infringed the plaintiff’s copyrights by creating de-
rivative works). For further discussion, see Brad A. Greenberg, Judging New 
Technologies (Aug. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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gy neutrality is not per se harmful or inefficient. But to achieve 
the perceived benefits of technology neutrality, lawmakers 
must properly discriminate among different technologies; to be 
substantively technology neutral, a statute must be specific 
about the technologies to which it will be neutrally applied. 
Conversely, technology specificity has unappreciated bene-
fits. By embracing the need for more frequent updates, technol-
ogy-specific laws can be drafted more carefully than technology-
neutral laws and be coupled with judicial tools and regulatory 
processes that help technology-specific laws achieve the policy 
goals of technology neutrality, and without the costs. Integral, 
though, is congressional recognition that other institutions—
courts and agencies—are needed to help adapt the law to tech-
nological change. 
In short, this Article argues that technological discrimina-
tion, a combination of neutrality and specificity, can better 
serve broader copyright and innovation policy goals by improv-
ing legal tailoring, reducing legal uncertainty, limiting efforts 
to exploit statutory ambiguity, and better balancing flexibility 
for technologists with compensation for copyright owners. At 
the same time, it can increase statutory longevity and promote 
treating like technologies alike. 
One path forward, outlined here, involves reshaping copy-
right law around a broadly defined exclusive right that reaches 
only covered technologies. The law’s scope is initially set by 
Congress and serves as a guide for the judiciary and an agency 
applying the law to new technologies. This proposal does not 
completely abandon the concept of neutrality, but pushes the 
law toward greater technology specificity. The statute would be 
drafted to technologies within specific domains (e.g., a 
handheld device, substantively equivalent to a pen or pencil, for 
writing), and the law would then be applied to new technologies 
that fit within those domains. To ensure that unforeseen tech-
nologies do not deplete the value of copyrights, the agency 
would issue rules regarding whether a new technology is within 
the statute’s covered technologies and would set compulsory li-
censes for uncovered technologies. This would amend legal de-
faults that grant authors control over new technologies without 
swinging the pendulum back to no-control. A compulsory li-
cense regime for unforeseen technologies provides an equitable 
backstop for the copyright system. 
This proposal implicitly embraces technology 
exceptionalism—the position that new technologies often de-
Greenberg_5fmt  
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mand new legal rules. This claim is familiar from the cyberlaw 
debate of recent years. Cyberlaw advocates, as technology 
exceptionalists, argued that the Internet is special and thus re-
quires special legal tools.16 Skeptics, on the other hand, argued 
that the Internet is merely a focal point for the study of numer-
ous already established areas of law (e.g., tort, contract, crimi-
nal procedure); cyberlaw, as Judge Easterbrook famously re-
marked, is nothing more than “law of the horse.”17 This Article 
moves beyond the basic premise of technology exceptionalism to 
show how copyright law has repeatedly struggled when it has 
attempted to treat different technologies alike. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches copyright’s 
repeated conflicts with new technologies and introduces the 
promises of technology neutrality generally and as embodied in 
the 1976 Act specifically. Part II then deconstructs technology 
neutrality. It exposes four overlooked problems—prediction, the 
penumbra, perspective, and pretense—and discusses the force 
in each major copyright content-technology conflict of the past 
four decades. Finally, Part III argues that technological dis-
crimination can be socially beneficial and offers a more technol-
ogy-specific alternative for achieving technology-neutral goals, 
showing how this would have affected the outcome in Aereo and 
would have created greater clarity as to copyright liability for 
cloud-computing technologies generally. This Article concludes 
with a brief discussion of the implications of this rethinking for 
other technology-neutral legal regimes, such as electronic sig-




 16. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Dig-
ital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 518 (2003) (“The cyberspace enclo-
sure movement threatens to reverse this process by forcing our physical prop-
erty assumptions on the online environment where they are unnecessary, 
harmful, and wrong.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points 
of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003) (arguing that control will trump anar-
chy on the Internet by examining Pennsylvania’s recent attempts to restrict 
internet access to illegal pornography). 
 17. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208. 
  
1502 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1495 
 
I.  TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY’S PROMISE   
A. COPYRIGHT AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES  
Modern copyright law’s existence can be traced to a trans-
cendent technology: the movable-type printing press. In an ef-
fort to control the information that could be shared with the 
masses, governments restricted who could licitly print and con-
trol the publication of certain writings.18 Subsequent technolog-
ical and social changes led to Britain’s 1710 Statute of Anne, 
the matriarch of copyright law.19 Unlike the printing privileges 
that preceded it, copyright law offered the dream of artistic 
riches to anyone who authored a copyrightable work.20  
Copyright encourages authorship through incentives, pri-
marily the promise of control over a work and its commerciali-
zation.21 In the interest of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,” the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to 
provide authors with exclusive rights over the use of their crea-
tive works.22 Copyright law’s subject matter and scope have ex-
panded dramatically since the first statute was enacted in 
1790;23 protection now subsists in any original work of author-
 
 18. EATON DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTU-
AL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 54–59 (1879); 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3–7 (1967). 
 19. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_ 
century/anne_1710.asp. See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Stat-
ute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
965 (2010) (examining the origins of copyright and subsequent development). 
 20. But see Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copy-
right Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 319 
(2010) (discussing the Statute of Anne’s stringent formalities). Copyright law 
also nurtured a free-speech culture by removing government licensing from 
the publishing business. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 309, 316 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 335–36 (1996) (discussing the incentives cre-
ated by a democratic paradigm of copyright). 
 21. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003) (presenting an 
economic analysis focusing on copyright law). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In the Progress Clause, also called the In-
tellectual Property Clause, “Science” refers to the province of copyright and 
“useful Arts” to patent. 
 23. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1802) (“[F]or 
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and 
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein 
mentioned.”). For a discussion of copyright’s growth, see generally Neil W. 
Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DI-
RECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) (arguing that copy-
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ship fixed in a tangible medium and grants the copyright owner 
exclusive rights over, inter alia, reproduction, distribution, ad-
aptation, and performance.24 
The dominant theory for U.S. intellectual property law is 
utilitarianism—copyright is the chosen means to a principled 
end.25 The framers intended to promote cultural progress and 
knowledge transfer by providing authors with the “economic in-
centive to create and disseminate ideas.”26 Under this theory, 
the Supreme Court has indicated that authors ought to benefit 
from their labors, but whether they actually do so is ancillary 
to the public benefit reaped by an author’s motivation to create 
an original work.27 
In copyright’s story, technology has played the part of both 
hero and villain.28 Technology has promoted copyright values by 
 
right content industries have successfully lobbied Congress with interests not 
necessarily shared by the public). 
 24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2012). 
 25. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (discussing the extent to 
which copyright law can be explained as a means for efficient allocation of re-
sources); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 115 
(5th ed. 2008) (“The utilitarian approach makes a person’s claim to property 
tentative. It can be taken from him in principle if the beneficiaries of the ex-
propriation gain more in utility than the owner loses.”); Abraham Bell & Gide-
on Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 547 (2005) 
(“[T]here is widespread agreement that the law orders property in response to 
societal needs, rather than in obeisance to a moral command or the natural 
order of the universe.”). 
 26. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that copy-
right established “a marketable right to the use of one’s expression”); Mills 
Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 187 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“Achieving that fundamental objective of the copyright laws requires provid-
ing incentives both to the creation of works of art and to their dissemination.”). 
 27. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the fair use doctrine); Twen-
tieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate moti-
vation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting availability . . . .”). 
 28. See generally REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW IX (1961) (“[T]echnical ad-
vances have brought in new industries and new methods for the reproduction 
and dissemination of the . . . works that comprise the subject matter of copy-
right.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CON-
TROL CREATIVITY (2004); Clark D. Asay, Copyright’s Technological Interde-
pendencies, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189 (2015); Anupam Chander, How Law 
Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639 (2014); Ben Depoorter, Technology 
and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
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increasing both the quantity of and access to copyrightable 
works—providing new mediums of expression, and in the pro-
cess new types of authorship,29 as well as facilitating geometric 
growth in the quantity of creative expression. New technologies 
also have dramatically expanded modes of reproduction and 
dissemination, thereby increasing access to copyrighted works. 
Novel mediums and modes have opened new markets for com-
mercializing copyrighted works. But technology also has un-
dermined copyright incentives by supplanting existing markets 
for such works,30 facilitating large-scale infringement,31 and 
threatening to make existing law obsolete.32 New technologies 
both increase the uses that consumers can make of copyrighted 
works33 and, in tandem, may provide content owners with new 
technological means to limit uses.34 At the same time, copyright 
 
1831 (2009); Dr. Mihály Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO “In-
ternet” Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1613 (2001); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological 
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of 
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 
(2000); Harry Surden, Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 135 (2013); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Pol-
icy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2003). 
 29. For example, the invention of motion picture camera technology creat-
ed a new possible medium of expressive work, the motion picture, or film. 
 30. See Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 1631. 
 31. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (noting “undisputed evidence at summary judgment of mas-
sive end-user infringement”); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 
634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating that Aimster’s “very raison d’etre appears to 
be the facilitation of and contribution to copyright infringement on a massive 
scale”); Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695 (2011) (examining the contemporary problems 
with copyright enforcement through the lens of scalability). 
 32. New technology does not per se result in conflict with copyright law. 
As Peter DiCola and Matthew Sag note: “No significant upheaval arises in 
those rare instances when content owners are also the inventors of a 
new copyright technology [such as DVD encryption technology].” Peter DiCola 
& Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 179 (2012). Conflict, though, is common and frequent. 
 33. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1909 
(2007) (“Supporters of copyright enhancements maintain that copyright own-
ers need broader rights because technology has both enabled new and exciting 
ways of dissemination and chipped away at their control of their works.”). 
 34. Beyond technological protection measures, the digital age also has 
changed the way consumers experience copyrighted works. See generally 
NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, From Hav-
ing Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. 
Copyright Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY 39 (Hugh 
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law exerts substantial influence over which new technologies, 
particularly those facilitating new forms of distribution, will be 
permitted to enter a market.35 
These dynamics frequently result in conflicts between cop-
yright content owners and technologists whose innovations 
make unauthorized uses of the copyrighted content.36 An early 
example gives some shape to this push-and-pull relationship. 
In the late 1800s, long before copyright protected sound record-
ings, it attached to sheet music—and the music business was 
good. Then along came the gramophone and the player piano, 
technological innovations that enabled even the instrumentally 
ignorant to fill a home with the beauty of Beethoven and Bach. 
These machines also played copyrighted musical compositions 
that had been captured on records and perforated music rolls, 
respectively, which were manufactured and sold without the 
copyright owners’ permission or compensation. Music publish-
ers sued, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that piano rolls 
(and, by implication, records) were non-infringing because they 
were not human readable—and thus were unlike sheet music—
and also because the relevant copyright statute did not speak to 
such technology.37 After losing in court, composers took their 
fight to Congress, which quickly moved to include in the 1909 
 
C. Hansen ed., 2000). The consumer market for copyrighted works has trans-
formed from one of purchasing copies to one of purchasing licenses that limit 
permissible uses. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intel-
lectual and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1235–37 (2015). 
 35. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Dig-
ital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002); Wu, supra note 28. Similar 
regulatory limitations to market entrants are seen in non-copyright fields, too. 
See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Your Request To Innovate Has Been Denied, FORBES (Apr. 
14, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=293& 
siteid=2235&id=5632623&t=1397485800 (discussing ride-sharing startups 
that challenge taxicabs and a legal recruiting website that cuts out the 
headhunter, and noting that “[i]n each case, a new market entrant had to ask 
permission of some power to innovate, and that power imposed limits”). Limit-
ing market competitors, in turn, can hamper innovation. See Tim Wu, Intellec-
tual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 
125–26 (2006) (“[T]he broad Edison patent slowed down progress . . . .” (quot-
ing Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Pa-
tent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885–88 (1990))). 
 36. See Randal C. Picker, The Yin and Yang of Copyright and Technology, 
55 COMM. ACM 30 (Jan. 2012), http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2012/1/144807 
-the-yin-and-yang-of-copyright-and-technology/fulltext (“New waves of tech-
nology have created novel expressive opportunities and dramatic improve-
ments in the ability to distribute copyrighted works. But new technology rare-
ly asks permission, and with each technical advance, we have seen new 
opportunities and new clashes.”). 
 37. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
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Copyright Act provisions extending the definition of “copy” to 
machine-readable copies and establishing a compulsory licens-
ing regime for sheet music embodied in a record or perforated 
roll.38 
A much more recent content-technology conflict, to which I 
return throughout this Article, involved television broadcasters 
and an Internet-based broadcast delivery service. Aereo leased 
to subscribers a personal antenna that captured over-the-air 
television, copied and digitized the signal, and then sent it into 
the subscriber’s home over the Internet in near-real-time or 
later at the subscriber’s desire.39 Television broadcasters sued, 
claiming that Aereo infringed Section 106(4) of the 1976 Copy-
right Act by making unlicensed transmissions.40 Aereo argued 
that its transmissions were not public, and therefore did not in-
fringe the public performance right in Section 106(4), because 
every transmission occurred on a one-to-one basis—one anten-
na to make one copy that could only be accessed by one sub-
scriber. The dispute moved through the courts at a blistering 
pace; barely two years after the lawsuit was filed in the South-
ern District of New York,41 the Supreme Court held that Aereo’s 
technology did not absolve it of copyright liability. Aereo’s 
transmissions were treated as public performances and thus in-
fringed the broadcasters’ public performance rights.42 The same 
day, Aereo waved the white flag.43 
 
 38. The compulsory license was effectuated by the 1909 Copyright Act, 
which also created an exemption for coin-operated machines (i.e., jukeboxes). 
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded by 1976 Copyright 
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). 
 39. The “live” transmission is delayed a few seconds. 
 40. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503–04 (2014). 
 41. Complaint, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12CV01540 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 676194. 
 42. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 43. See Victor Luckerson, Aereo Backer Barry Diller: “It’s Over Now,” 
TIME (June 25, 2014), http://time.com/2921376/aereo-barry-diller. Shortly 
thereafter Aereo attempted to avail itself of the Section 111 statutory license, 
though during litigation both the broadcasters and Aereo had stated that 
Aereo was ineligible. See Joint Letter to Judge Alison J. Nathan, Aereo, 2012 
WL 676194; see also US Copyright Office Says Aereo Not a Cable Company 
Under Terms of Copyright Act, CNBC (July 17, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://www 
.cnbc.com/id/101838646. Aereo later filed for bankruptcy and settled with 
broadcasters for $950,000. See Erik Larson, Aereo Settles Broadcasters’ Claims 
for Penny on the Dollar, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:16 AM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-21/aereo-settles-broadcasters 
-copyright-claims-for-950-000; Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files 
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/ 
22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html. However, a district court in a re-
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Such content-technology conflicts have historically traveled 
along one of three paths. For some new technologies copyright 
is held inapplicable, thus squelching liability, but Congress re-
sponds by amending the law to include that technology (e.g., 
player pianos, cable transmission, audio home recording devic-
es). For other technologies, copyright law governs the technolo-
gy’s use of copyrighted content, and private ordering ensues 
(e.g., radio, film adaptations) or the technology disappears (e.g., 
Aereo, DVD copying). For yet another group of technologies, 
copyright is deemed applicable, but the technology’s otherwise 
infringing use of copyrighted content is subject to an exception 
or exemption (e.g., photocopiers, VCRs, Internet search en-
gines). 
The arguments of opposing parties are fairly predictable in 
these conflicts. Rooted in distinct understandings of copyright’s 
utilitarian purpose, each party’s argument follows a general 
formula that puts author incentives and technological innova-
tion at diametrically opposed poles.44 On the one hand, content 
owners generally argue that excluding new technologies or ex-
empting new uses harms copyright markets, which, in turn, 
undermines certainty regarding ex ante incentives. Key to this 
contention is that the author of a copyrighted work receives ex-
clusive control over exploiting known and potential markets.45 
Though a potential market that arises only after the emergence 
of a new technology, if not reasonably foreseeable, could not 
have explicitly motivated an author ex ante and would repre-
sent a windfall, such markets are within copyright’s constitu-
tionally authorized incentive system.46 
 
lated case ruled that an Aereo competitor, providing functionally the same 
service, is entitled to the statutory license. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
AereoKiller, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 44. An interesting case study is that of Sony Corporation, the producer of 
the personal videocassette recorders that once allegedly posed an existential 
threat to Hollywood. After defeating the claim that its technology infringed 
copyright, Sony became a major content producer through newly developed 
film and music studio divisions. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: 
HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 21–36 (1987). 
 45. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
568 (1985); see also Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively 
Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 98 (2014) (“Even if copyright owners choose 
not to actively license a work, or intentionally withhold licensing because they 
do not want the work to find an audience or be altered, courts have held that 
an infringing use likely harms a market that the copyright owners could ex-
ploit.”). 
 46. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003) (suggesting that Con-
gress’s long pattern of extending copyright’s duration and its coverage to new 
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The developers of new technologies, on the other hand, ar-
gue that subjecting the new use or distribution tool to copyright 
liability will threaten innovation.47 Though it is unclear what 
role copyright should play in innovation policy—promote tech-
nological innovation, avoid hindering it, or just refuse to treat it 
differently than other allegedly infringing activities—
technologists’ concerns relate to potential liability hindering 
technological development or enjoining products already to 
market.48 In short: “[c]opyright can kill technology.”49 
Generally, it is difficult to know what technologies might 
have been but never were.50 Like a dispute that settles before a 
lawsuit is filed, identifying research and development halted 
before news of any project is released can be elusive. But Mi-
chael Carrier’s research suggests that potential copyright lia-
 
technologies could motivate authorship by creating expectation of future ex-
pansion); see also Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 1619–21. Some have questioned 
this approach, most emphatically in the context of the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act, which retroactively extended copyright duration twenty years for 
works already in existence. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254–63 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“[N]o one could reasonably conclude that copyright’s traditional 
economic rationale applies here. The extension will not act as an economic 
spur encouraging authors to create new works.”); see also Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 
(2009) (discussing the social costs of granting new-market windfalls to copy-
right owners). The term extension was seen as a gift to entertainment compa-
nies, which had valuable properties from the 1920s and 1930s, and was deri-
sively known as “The Mickey Mouse Protection Act.” See Lawrence Lessig, 
Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2001). 
 47. For a succinct discussion of these tradeoffs, seen most clearly with 
secondary liability doctrines and the DMCA’s safe harbor, see Randal C. Pick-
er, Copyright and Technology: Déjà Vu All Over Again, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 41; see also Ginsburg, supra note 28; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics 
of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1084 (1997) 
(arguing that patent law more effectively promotes innovation because of doc-
trines balancing the rights of inventors with improvers that are absent in cop-
yright law). 
 48. See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2257 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1386–90 
(2004); Robert Hof, “Ten Years of Chilled Innovation,” BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 
28, 2005) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (interview with Lawrence 
Lessig in which he says that in Silicon Valley, following the Supreme Court’s 
Grokster decision, “already money has shifted into places which will avoid any 
conflict with the copyright holders”). 
 49. Picker, supra note 47, at 41. 
 50. A snapshot, though, comes from Michael Carrier, who cataloged nu-
merous abandoned technologies by interviewing founders and executives from 
technology companies, the recording industry, and venture capital firms. Mi-
chael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 891. 
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bility increases ex ante caution.51 From a welfare standpoint, 
such a chill on technological development before the technolo-
gy’s capabilities could be known would raise policy concerns be-
cause a technology’s commercial viability and social utility are 
exceptionally difficult to predict.52 Frequently, technologies are 
developed for one purpose but subsequently acquire greater 
meaning in an unforeseen area.53 For example, Alexander Gra-
ham Bell struggled to convince consumers that his telephone 
would be useful for more than broadcasting the day’s news54 
and Thomas Edison thought his phonograph would be used 
mostly to record deathbed testaments.55 Both men were legend-
ary inventors, but neither realized their creations’ potential. If, 
for example, Bell gave up development of the telephone or its 
network because broadcasting news would have implicated 
copyright law, society would have lost a valuable new technolo-
gy.56 And because innovation is iterative, many subsequent 
technologies might never have come into being.  
Conversely, some new communication technologies fit the 
model of player pianos and videocassette recorders and Google 
Book Search—technologies whose developers believed either 
that copyright law would not apply or that, if it did, their tech-
nological use would be free from liability. These technologists 
were willing to innovate first and worry about the legal conse-
 
 51. Id. at 950–58. 
 52. See infra notes 124–29 and accompanying text. 
 53. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 135 (1997) (“[N]either 
manufacturers nor customers know how or why the products will be used, and 
hence do not know what specific features of the product will and will not ulti-
mately be valued.”). 
 54. See IRA FLATOW, THEY ALL LAUGHED . . . FROM LIGHT BULBS TO LA-
SERS: THE FASCINATING STORIES BEHIND THE GREAT INVENTIONS THAT HAVE 
CHANGED OUR LIVES 83 (1992); JAMES GARDNER, SIDESTEP AND TWIST 135–37 
(2012); DON NORMAN & TAMARA DUNAEFF, THINGS THAT MAKE US SMART: 
DEFENDING HUMAN ATTRIBUTES IN THE AGE OF THE MACHINE 191 (1994). 
Similarly, Elisha Gray, who claimed he invented the telephone a few weeks 
before Bell and lost the race to the patent office, envisioned the telephone as 
“nothing more than a toy.” FLATOW, supra, at 72; see also id. at 76 (“Believing 
speech transmission to be a waste of time, the top technical journal of the in-
dustry, The Telegrapher, put down the idea, claiming it was not new and the 
telephone had ‘no direct practical application.’”). 
 55. See Nathan Rosenberg, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology, 
10 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 3, 14 (1972). 
 56. That is, at least until someone else either is willing to assume the risk 
or sees the telephone’s non-copyright-related potential. 
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quences later.57 However, in recent years, many, if not most, of 
these technologies have been developed and defended in court 
by technology industry leaders that can afford the fight.58 
The current copyright regime, with its broad defaults, ap-
pears to have two predominant effects on the development of 
copyright-using technologies: it either encourages risk-taking 
by those who can afford the liability, or discourages technologi-
cal development by those who cannot. Napster and other peer-
ing platforms—start-up risk-seekers—fit neither paradigm, but 
in the wake of Napster’s demise, start-ups and their funders 
reportedly became unwilling to move against the grain of copy-
right liability.59 And with good reason, as courts evaluating 
claims that a new technology infringes copyright might over-
value the costs while undervaluing potential future uses, even 
identifiable uses.60 
 
 57. This is similar to the practice, at least common in Silicon Valley dur-
ing the past decade, of creating something new and waiting until it becomes 
wildly popular to figure out how to monetize it. See, e.g., Matthew Braga, 
Twitter’s Road to IPO: Grow First, Monetize Later, FIN. POST (Sept. 13, 2013, 
4:50 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/twitters-road-to-ipo 
-grow-first-monetize-later?__lsa=75a4-7f74 (“It’s a common story amongst In-
ternet companies of recent vintage, a grow-first-monetize-later strategy that 
has spawned some particularly successful product and services—at least, in 
terms of engagement and size.”); David Gelles, For Facebook, It’s Users First 
and Profits Later, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 20, 2014, 8:52 PM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/for-facebook-its-users-first-and-profits 
-later; Damon Lavrinc, After 10 Years in the Business, Tesla Finally Turns a 
Profit, WIRED (May 8, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/tesla 
-profit-q1-2013. 
 58. Notably, Google. This poses its own set of normative concerns—
namely, whether it is good to refine copyright policy mainly through the judi-
cial process; whether deep-pocket technologists’ interests sufficiently proxy 
those of the public at large; and whether this process has significant anti-
competitive consequences. 
 59. There are other anomalies, such as digital audio tapes, which were 
commercialized, but then became largely unavailable at market. 
 60. See R. Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: 
A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 877, 887–91 (2005); see also Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of 
Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 678 (2010) (“[T]he regulation of 
inchoate technologies cannot, and should not, be approached from the perspec-
tive of whether the technology itself or technological progress is ‘good’ or 
‘bad.’”). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (noting that in some cases, particu-
larly when a new use is seen as “socially beneficial, a court may overempha-
size its ‘transformativeness,’ and correspondingly underestimate the market 
consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the so-
cial benefit”); Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 1622–26 (“The Supreme Court has 
been more reluctant to ‘give full protection to the [copyright] monopoly’ when 
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These arguments are frequently heard from copyright con-
tent owners on one side and technologists on the other. Settling 
the debate is neither within the scope of this Article nor ante-
cedent to its analytic and normative conclusions. Rather, intro-
ducing the debate helps sketch the purported stakes behind 
content-technology conflicts.61 Congress had such interests in 
mind when it began the twenty-one-year process of overhauling 
the 1909 Act—when it thought it solved copyright law’s new-
technology problem with the 1976 Act. 
B. TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY AND THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 
The struggle to adapt law to new technologies is not unique 
to copyright law, and alongside the increasing pace of innova-
tion, numerous legal regimes have adopted a general drafting 
principle: technology neutrality.62 Foreign countries63 and in-
 
it has perceived that groups of copyright owners in particular sectors were 
seeking to prohibit a new form of reproduction and distribution, or to leverage 
their exclusive reproduction rights into monopoly power over the devices em-
ployed to effect the new kinds of reproductions.”). 
 61. For further reading, see Ginsburg, supra note 28; Lemley, supra note 
47. 
 62. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard & Theresa Lauerhass, Debalkanize the 
Telecommunications Marketplace, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 231 (1992) (examin-
ing the need for a technology-neutral implementation of telecommunications 
policies); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty 
for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1345–46 (2001) (dis-
cussing the inadequacies of prior frameworks and the need for a new test to 
remain technology-neutral); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to 
the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1015–17 (2010); 
Bert-Jaap Koops, Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-
Neutral?, in STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING PREV-
ALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops et al. eds., 2006) (arguing 
that ICT regulation should be technology-neutral); Stephanie K. Pell & Chris-
topher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward Reasonable Standards for 
Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117 (2012) (proposing a legislative model for law en-
forcement access standards and downstream privacy protections for location 
information); Eric Posner & John Yoo, The Patriot Act Under Fire, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 9, 2003, at A26; see also Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-
Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1700 (2010) (analyzing 
arguments for and against tech neutrality); Chris Reed, Taking Sides on 
Technology Neutrality, 4 SCRIPT-ED 263, 264–65 (2007) (critiquing the nar-
row approach taken by many to technology neutrality).  
 63. See, e.g., Nat’l Rugby League Invests Pty Ltd v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd 
[2012] FCAFC 59, ¶ 95 (Austl.) (“The desirability of technological neutrality—
of not limiting rights and defences to technologies known at the time when 
those rights and defences were enacted—has been acknowledged for some 
time.”); THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
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ternational agreements also have adopted the principle.64 Tech-
nology neutrality’s lodestar is intent to regulate behavior, not 
technology; to worry about what occurs, not how it occurs. 
Whereas technology-specific provisions refer to technological 
classes (e.g., the fountain pen), technology-neutral laws use 
“general, vague, open-textured terms that specify purposes, ef-
fects, functions, and other general characteristics”65 (e.g., any 
device or process that produces a perceptible writing). The for-
mer regulates fountain pens, whereas the latter could reach 
other pens, typewriters, smartphones, fax machines, and sky-
writers. The goal of technology neutrality is to disprove Justice 
Holmes’ law of the law: “[i]t cannot be helped, it is as it should 
be, that the law is behind the times.”66 
Though under-theorized, generally the principle of technol-
ogy neutrality contains two overarching goals.67 First, technolo-
gy neutrality seeks to promote a statute’s longevity—that is, to 
future-proof the law.68 The more technology specific a law is, 
the more difficult adapting to unforeseen technologies would 
seem to be; eventually, a technology will emerge that cannot 
 
SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 271–333 (Michael 
Geist ed., 2013) (discussing technology neutrality in Canada). 
 64. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty 
art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copy-
right Treaty]; accord MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE IN-
TERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEN-
TATION C8.06, 496–97 (2002); SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 17:75, 457 (2008); Professor Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Comment Letter on the Right of Making Available 2 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://  
copyright.gov/docs/making_available/comments/docket2014_2/Jane_Ginsburg 
.pdf (“Article 8 is designedly ‘technology neutral’ in order to avoid obsoles-
cence.”). 
 65. Ohm, supra note 62, at 1687. 
 66. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 294 (1920); see 
also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Pol-
icy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 566 (1998) (“[T]hat techno-
logical developments outpace the rate of legal change poses another particular 
problem for intellectual property rights; the law always lags behind 
the technology.”). 
 67. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race To 
Keep up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 270–
76 (noting future-proofing and equivalence); accord Ohm, supra note 62, at 
1691 (“Those who argue for tech neutrality too rarely explain in detail the rea-
soning behind their arguments. Quite often, tech neutrality is a principle or 
rule, and it almost seems to go without saying. Even when proponents of neu-
trality explain their reasoning, they often do so cursorily. As a result, we lack 
satisfying theoretical explanations for tech neutrality.”). 
 68. See Koops, supra note 62; see also Ohm, supra note 62, at 1692–93; 
Reed, supra note 62, at 275–76. 
Greenberg_5fmt  
2016] RETHINKING TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY 1513 
 
reasonably be covered by the language of the technology-
specific statute.69 Technology neutrality attempts to invert the 
consequences of specificity; it presumes that laws untethered to 
specific technologies will be less disrupted by technological tur-
bulence. Rather than force the law to struggle with new tech-
nologies, and in the interest of sparing legislators the time-
consuming effort of frequent revisions, technology neutrality 
attempts to avoid ossification by making a statute more adapt-
able to technological advances.70 It does so through broad, open-
textured terms. 
Second, technology neutrality aims for greater doctrinal 
equivalence.71 By forcing the law to treat like things alike—to 
avoid limiting a right only to its exercise in extant technology 
or discriminating against older technology simply because it ex-
isted when the law was enacted—technology neutrality seeks to 
promote greater fairness in the law’s application. Whether a 
technology-neutral law applies to a given technology (new or 
old) is intended to turn on relevant features, factors, or charac-
teristics rather than express categorical inclusion. 
Additionally, technology neutrality often is adopted as an 
institutional arrangement, pushing questions arising from new 
technologies away from legislatures, to courts and administra-
tive agencies. Technology neutrality recognizes that legisla-
tures often take too long and may lack the expertise to fre-
quently update a law in light of new technologies.72 Accordingly, 
 
 69. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 67, at 266–68 (discussing section 1962(5) 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1872, which presumed 
paternity if a husband lived with his wife and was not impotent; the Radio Act 
of 1927, which regulated radio transmission on the belief that the only way to 
avoid interference was for separate signals to be transmitted across distinct 
frequencies (this technological constraint soon disappeared, but the licensing 
regime remained); and fencing-out statutes that limited recovery for rampag-
ing cattle to farmers who erected a fence calculated to keep cattle out (with the 
invention of barbed wire, such fences became feasible and the law’s purpose, to 
reduce liability for ranging farmers except where another landowner had 
erected a fence, was perverted)). 
 70. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 62, at 1688 (“Congress must often choose 
between tech neutrality and specificity when it drafts surveillance laws be-
cause the great challenge of surveillance is keeping up with the latest advanc-
es in technology.”). 
 71. See id. at 1691–92; Reed, supra note 62, at 276. 
 72. See Ohm, supra note 62, at 1694 n.55 (“Often arguments like these 
carry a hint of superiority and maybe even a sense of ridicule. Perhaps other 
societal institutions can keep up with technology, but not Congress, which is 
stodgy and out of touch, full of elderly members who are the same.” (citing Jim 
Puzzanghera, Weighing High-Tech Bills in Analog: Political Issues Pile up in 
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the legislature might wish to delegate the responsibility of de-
termining whether a law applies to a new technology to anoth-
er, presumably better-suited, institution (e.g., the judiciary or 
an administrative agency). Or it might draft a technology-
neutral law so broadly that the law applies, per se, to future 
technologies. Deciding between the two involves allocating, or 
retaining, the power to regulate in a given area. The former op-
tion is based on a presumption that other institutions either 
should shape policy or are capable of evaluating new technology 
by analogy; the latter evinces a fear of formalism.73 Generally, 
delegating to courts or an agency increases administrative 
costs, legal delay, and uncertainty, but also enables better tai-
loring.74 Per se inclusion, on the other hand, is easier to admin-
ister and would be expected to increase legal certainty,75 but 
leads to overinclusive application of the law.76 
Among numerous radical changes that Congress adopted 
in the 1976 Copyright Act77 was the principle of technology neu-
trality.78 Future-proofing and promoting equivalence color the 
 
the Fast-Evolving Sector, but Congress’ Expertise Isn’t up to Date, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2006, at C1)). 
 73. The choice has significant consequences, discussed infra Part III.A. 
 74. See infra Part III.B. 
 75. Though not necessarily. See infra Part II.B. 
 76. If this sounds analogous to the classic rules-standards debate, it is. 
See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1977). Significant departures in the 1976 Act 
included dropping formalities as a condition to copyright protection, see Brad 
A. Greenberg, More than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s 
Opt-out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1038–39 (2012); 
scrapping the publication requirement, see Jake Linford, A Second Look at the 
Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 605 n.109 
(2011); transitioning to a single fixed term, see 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); giving 
authors an unwaivable termination right, see Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s 
Ghost and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 391, 393–94 
(2013); disaggregating each copyright into an infinitely divisible bundle of 
rights, see § 201(d)(2); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5 (1976); codifying the fair 
use exception to infringement, see § 107; and preempting state copyright laws, 
see § 301. 
 78. Technology neutrality also has been referred to by courts as “media 
neutrality.” See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (“In-
voking the concept of ‘media neutrality,’ the Publishers urge that the ‘transfer 
of a work between media’ does not ‘alte[r] the character of’ that work for copy-
right purposes. That is indeed true.”); Peter Mayer Publishers Inc. v. 
Shilovskaya, 11 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Section 101 reflects 
copyright law’s general requirement of ‘media-neutrality.’ The concept of ‘me-
dia-neutrality’—that a change in medium does not affect a copyrighted work’s 
status—is well-settled.”). 
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1976 Copyright Act,79 which set technology-neutral defaults in 
three fundamental areas: subject matter, exclusive rights, and, 
to a lesser degree, statutory definitions. Best known is the lan-
guage of Section 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in ac-
cordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”80 The technology-neutral aspect of Section 102(a) has 
three features: copyright law covers a copyrighted work fixed in 
(1) any technology (2) so long as something or someone can per-
ceive it and (3) regardless of whether Congress mentioned the 
technology specifically. 
The technology-neutral nature of exclusive rights is less 
explicit, but no less express in the structure of Section 106 and 
the legislative history. Section 106 defines exclusive rights in 
broad terms81 and incorporates technology-neutral definitions 
in Section 101 to avoid “confining the scope of an author’s 
rights on the basis of the present technology.”82 Notably, the 
 
 79. Treatise writer David Nimmer calls technology neutrality a “unifying 
theme” of the 1976 Act. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 12A.16(B) (1963); see also Greenberg v. Nat’l Geo. Soc’y, 533 F.3d 
1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he principle of media neutrality is a staple of 
the Copyright Act[.]”). And, indeed, the Copyright Office had urged Congress 
as early as at least 1903 to improve copyright law’s ability to adjust to new 
technologies. See Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 
61–62 (1925) (reprinting the conclusion of the Report on Copyright Legislation 
(Dec. 1, 1903)); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copy-
right: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 522 (1945) (“When scientific invention or in-
genuity gives an unauthorized person a new way to cash in on the author’s 
creative ability, the law must either squeeze the novel device into an ill-fitting 
box or leave the author helplessly watching another man grow wealthy from 
what he himself gave to the world.”). 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
 82. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 
6381, and H.R. 6835 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the 
Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 32–33 (1965) 
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of George Cary, Deputy Regis-
ter of Copyrights); cf. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24 (1998) (reiterating 
that “[i]n general, all of these provisions are technology neutral”); STAFF OF 
THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (Comm. Print 1965) [here-
inafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT] (“[I]t would be a mistake for the statute, in 
trying to deal with such a new and evolving field as that of comput-
er technology, to include an explicit provision that could later turn out to be 
too broad or too narrow.”). 
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tangible form of reproductions—copies and phonorecords—need 
not be physical or visually perceptible; it is sufficient that a 
copy or phonorecord is a perceivable instantiation of the copy-
righted work.83 Similarly, transmitting a work publicly, in vio-
lation of Section 106(4), can occur “by means of any device or 
process,”84 including those “not yet in use or even invented.”85 
Though the defaults were technology neutral, the 1976 Act 
was enacted with numerous technology-specific provisions.86 
For example, Section 111 created a compulsory license for cable 
retransmission. This favored the struggling cable industry, long 
hampered by copyright litigation and potential FCC regula-
tion,87 by converting broadcasters’ exclusive rights into liability 
rules; the Section 111 compulsory license is only available to 
technologies that fit within its narrow definition. The 1976 Act 
also included vestiges of the 1909 Act, such as the compulsory 
licenses for jukeboxes88 and mechanical reproductions of musi-
cal works.89 And Section 114 created a complicated system for 
exclusive rights in sound recordings.90 
 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (explaining that if the work of author-
ship is a “literary work,” the copies or phonorecords could take any form, “in-
cluding books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, 
and so forth”); see also id. (“There is no need, for example, to specify the 
copyrightability of electronic or concrete music in the statute since the form of 
a work would no longer be of any importance . . . .”). 
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63. 
 86. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Subsequently, Con-
gress has amended copyright law with numerous additional technology-
specific provisions. 
 87. Though the Supreme Court disagreed with the broadcasters, holding 
that cable equipment simply offers a powerful antenna that is functionally 
similar to the antennas that individual viewers can erect to capture over-the-
air broadcast, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 
390, 399–400 (1968), the FCC soon proposed giving broadcasters through regu-
lation of the cable industry what the 1909 Act did not. See Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 432 (1968) (never enact-
ed). The potential regulation “slowed, if not froze[]” the cable industry’s 
growth. Wu, supra note 28, at 319; see also Leonard Chazen & Leonard 
Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 1820, 1820 (1970) (suggesting alternative regulatory approaches). 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 116. 
 89. Id. § 115. Some scholars argue that this has created a below-market 
rate for privately negotiated music licenses. Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling 
the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 680–83 (2003); see 
generally Frederick F. Greenman, Jr. & Alvin Deutsch, The Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal and the Statutory Mechanical Royalty: History and Prospect, 1 
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Because the 1976 Act was a mixture of technology-neutral 
and technology-specific provisions, it is necessary to disentan-
gle the struggles of the neutral and specific provisions. Accord-
ingly, the problems discussed in Part II are only those that 
have arisen as a result of copyright’s technology-neutral de-
faults. In Part III, I will explain how technological discrimina-
tion, by avoiding the extremes of neutrality and specificity that 
have defined U.S. copyright law, can avoid the pitfalls of both. 
Congress’s rationale for making the 1976 Act’s default pro-
visions—particularly subject matter and exclusive rights—
technology neutral appears plain from the legislative history. 
Technology neutrality was adopted to “avoid the artificial and 
largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory 
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon 
the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”91 Congress was 
worried about the development of new technologies that would 
use copyrighted works but would be outside copyright’s reach 
(and, thereby, the copyright owner’s control).92 In other words, 
Congress wanted to future-proof the law so it would apply to 
unknown and unforeseen technologies, and would do so in an 
equivalent manner. By using broad language,93 Congress indi-
cated that copyright law would per se apply to future copyright-
using technologies; the 1976 Act conferred broad rights to au-
thors, to which courts would subsequently be asked to carve-out 
narrow exceptions.94 
Based on the assumption that technology neutrality would 
behave in copyright law as proponents believe it behaves gen-
erally,95 “Congress meant to change the old pattern and enact a 
 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1982) (discussing the Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal and the distribution of royalties and royalty rate setting). 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 114; see also Loren, supra note 89 (arguing for a revision of 
the 1976 Act). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976). 
 92. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 28, at 5. 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra 
note 82 (“We have tried to phrase the broad rights granted in such a way that 
they can be adapted as time goes on to each of the new advancing media.”); 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 82, at 13–14 (“A real danger to be 
guarded against is that of confining the scope of an author’s rights on the basis 
of the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses much 
of its value because of unforeseen technical advances. For these reasons, we 
believe that the author’s rights should be stated in the statute in broad terms 
 . . . .”). 
 94. See Litman, supra note 28, at 281; supra note 93. 
 95. The legislative history shows no evidence of technology neutrality be-
ing challenged on its ability to future-proof the statute and promote equiva-
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statute that would cover new technologies, as well as old,” in 
the words of Justice Blackmun.96 That all new copyright-using 
technologies are subject to copyright law gave the 1976 Act the 
appearance of flexibility in the face of increasingly rapid tech-
nological change. Only authors or users unhappy with the law’s 
application would feel the need to lobby Congress for technolo-
gy-specific treatment. Neutrality was a blunt tool, but it ap-
peared to guard copyright law against obsolescence, even if 
over time it became apparent that the law was often too gen-
eral to be adequately tailored to new technologies.97 Indeed, 
four decades later, technology neutrality continues to be touted 
as value-maximizing in copyright law.98 
 
lence. The criticisms then, to the extent there were any, related to the broad 
nature of rights conferred to authors by technology-neutral defaults and the 
limited number of statutory exceptions and exemptions for specific uses and 
users. See supra note 93. 
 96. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–
58 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 97. Which Congress acknowledged explicitly in the DMCA’s legislative 
history and implicitly with its passage. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 21 (1998) 
(noting that the DMCA was enacted as “part of the [international] effort to 
begin updating national laws for the digital era”). 
 98. See, e.g., Brief for International Federation of the Phonographic In-
dustry (IFPI), et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Am. Broad. 
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 891768, at *2; 
Maria Martin-Prat, The Future of Copyright in Europe, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
29, 44 (2014) (presenting an extended version of the Twenty-Seventh Horace 
S. Manges Lecture delivered on April 7, 2014, at Columbia Law School, in 
which the head of the European Commission’s Copyright Unit stated that “the 
more technology accelerates, the less copyright should rely on technology-
bound concepts”); Guido Westkamp, Code, Copying, Competition: The Subver-
sive Force of Para-Copyright and the Need for an Unfair Competition Based 
Reassessment of DRM Laws After Infopaq, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 665, 
705 (2011) (arguing that technology neutrality is important to copyright law 
because it helps adjudicators keep in perspective a “multitude of interests that 
must be brought in line”); Jay W. Ferguson, Comment, XM Lawsuit: Threats to 
the Incentive Model of Copyright Genesis and the Obsolescence of the AHRA in 
a Digital Age of Hybrid Technology, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 162–63 (2007) 
(arguing for a technology-neutral amendment to address “hybrid technology” 
that facilitate transmission, which in the music context is governed by com-
pulsory license, and enable reproduction for later enjoyment, which is not au-
thorized by compulsory license); Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The 
Case for a Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2131 
(2009) (arguing for “a single, technology neutral standard for determining the 
royalties for digital radio”). Similarly, the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) 
has been criticized as too narrowly focused on art forms that were better 
known at the time of the copyright amendment. See Martina Hinojosa, Note, 
Challenges for Emerging Art Forms Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, 11 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 433, 434 (2013). 
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But technology neutrality has not delivered the anticipated 
benefits. Judges have struggled with applying “the nebulous 
concept”99 and have treated similar technologies unevenly and 
inconsistently, often based on small technological differences 
that are functionally irrelevant.100 Additionally, not long after 
the 1976 Copyright Act took effect on January 1, 1978, copy-
right content owners complained that the statute was outmod-
ed or being incorrectly applied, and lobbied for revisions.101 At 
the urging of frustrated copyright owners and even the Register 
of Copyrights,102 the statute has been amended thirty-one times 
to add or revise technology-specific provisions. Revisions have 
added complexity to the 1976 Act, and on occasion without 
clear benefit to copyright owners or users. 
For example, in response to strong record industry lobby-
ing regarding digital audio recordings—largely motivated by 
fear of a new technology that could “make perfect multi-
generational digital audio recordings”103 and the outcome of the 
legal challenge to the home videocassette recorder—Congress 
passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).104 The 
AHRA amended copyright law to impose a levy on manufactur-
ers of digital audio recording devices.105 But, levy aside, the 
technology was commercially unsuccessful, and Chapter 10 of 
 
 99. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 533 F.3d 1244, 1272 (11th Cir. 
2008) (Birch, J., dissenting). 
 100. See infra Part II.C. 
 101. Jessica Litman notes that, in 1989, nineteen copyright bills were 
pending in Congress. Litman, supra note 28, at 275. 
 102. See Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Re-
sponses to Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 109, 109–10 (1989) (providing several examples of authors and 
copyright owners urging reform of the 1976 Act); Ralph Oman, 1976 Copyright 
Revision Revisited: “Lector, si Monumentum Requiris, Circumspice,” 34 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 29, 30 (1986) (arguing that, by reference to the litiga-
tion over the VCR and the debate over satellite communications, “regardless of 
Congress’ attempt to include these unknown technologies in the embrace of 
the new copyright law, the courts so far have politely declined their invita-
tion”). 
 103. Christopher Doval et al., The Next Great Copyright Act and the Future 
of Radio, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 378, 386 (2015); see also Re-
cording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 
1073 (9th Cir. 1999) (“With digital recording, by contrast [to analog], there is 
almost no degradation in sound quality, no matter how many generations of 
copies are made. Digital copying thus allows thousands of perfect or near per-
fect copies (and copies of copies) to be made from a single original recording.”). 
 104. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 
4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010). 
 105. Id. 
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U.S. Code Title 17 stands largely as an anachronism from a 
technological future that never was.106 For reasons discussed 
below, the failures of the AHRA are not inherent to greater 
technology specificity. 
Whereas the technology-specific provisions included with 
the 1976 Act signaled Congress’s belief that extant technology 
should be treated differently, those that have been added since 
suggest that the technology-neutral defaults did not serve their 
purpose for many new technologies. For example, the personal 
videocassette recorder and communication satellites both were 
emerging at the end of the revision process—in fact, the legal 
challenge to Sony’s Betamax began only three weeks after the 
1976 Act was signed107—but neither received special treatment. 
In turn, under the technology-neutral defaults, courts quickly 
“struggled” to apply copyright law to videocassette recorders 
and communications satellites,108 pushing the Betamax case to 
the Supreme Court and two technology-specific revisions relat-
ing to satellite transmission of distant television and local tele-
vision.109 The satellite provisions are notoriously impenetra-
ble.110  
Though copyright law should reach new types of authorial 
works and new technological mediums,111 it “may often produce 
unexpected and unjust results if spread uniformly over so many 
 
 106. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:84, Westlaw (da-
tabase updated Sept. 2015) (describing AHRA provisions regarding digital au-
dio recording devices). 
 107. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., No. CV 76-3520-
F (C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 1976). And the Sony Betamax had already been sold in 
U.S. stores for about a year. See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Univer-
sal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY STORIES 358, 359 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 
2006); see also LARDNER, supra note 44. Moreover, Betamax was not the first 
home video recording device. LARDNER, supra note 44, at 75–84; NICK LYONS, 
THE SONY VISION 202–15 (1976). 
 108. Litman, supra note 28, at 315–16. It may be that the window for ad-
dressing these emerging technologies had already closed by the time Congress 
became aware of their potential importance.  
 109. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 
3949 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 119); Satellite Home Viewer Im-
provement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B. § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 
1501 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 122). 
 110. See, e.g., William Patry, A Precis on Section 119, PATRY COPYRIGHT 
BLOG (May 25, 2006, 10:41 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/05/ 
precis-on-section-119.html (“Section 119 compulsory license for satellite re-
transmissions is not for the faint of heart.”). 
 111. See Chafee, supra note 79, at 504–05.  
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divergent things and acts.”112 The 1976 Act’s adoption of tech-
nology-neutral defaults—in recognition of the former principle 
and ignorance of the latter—is a poignant example. Recogniz-
ing that technology neutrality has not performed as expected 
helps illuminate deficiencies in the 1976 Act’s technology-
neutral language, specifically, and barriers to achieving tech-
nology neutrality, generally. Technology neutrality’s goals are 
intuitive, but, upon close inspection, they too often are neither 
desirable nor attainable. 
II.  DECONSTRUCTING TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY   
To avoid being made obsolete by technological changes, a 
law needs to anticipate innovations; it can do so through pres-
cience or, more realistically, provisions that enable flexible ap-
plication. In an attempt to achieve the latter, the 1976 Act 
chose broad terms that are inclusive of unforeseen technologies. 
Based on accepted principles at the time the law is passed, a 
technology-neutral law is drafted to regulate particular behav-
ior—a legal means to regulating an end use, regardless of the 
technological path along which the use travels. And in many 
circumstances this makes sense. 
For example, one would expect the author of a novella to 
have the same rights to control its exploitation regardless of 
whether it was written using a pen or typewriter or word pro-
cessor.113 Digitally compressed music offers another example of 
how the 1976 Act’s technology-neutral defaults may have 
spared copyright owners the formalistic fate of the sheet music 
composers. Like the piano rolls and wax records of roughly a 
century earlier, courts could have looked at MP3 and WAV 
files, and decided that the form of the music, of which there ex-
isted no physical copy, looked nothing like the types of copies or 
phonorecords identified in a technology-specific copyright law. 
Applying the logic of White-Smith Music would have placed dig-
itally compressed music outside copyright’s reach, and, thereby, 
enabled iTunes to sell music and webcasters to stream it with-
out any license or royalty liability for exploiting the musical 
composition. But that is not what happened. An obvious expla-
nation is that, unlike the 1870 Copyright Act that controlled in 
 
 112. Id. at 518. 
 113. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001) (holding that 
the author of a newspaper article licensed as part of a collective work retained 
control over the use of that article as an individual contribution to a digital 
database). 
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White-Smith Music, the 1976 Act is technology neutral and the 
examples of copies and phonorecords enumerated in Section 
101 are just that: examples.114 The list is neither exhaustive nor 
limited even to technologies known at the time of the law’s en-
actment. Accordingly, a digitally compressed music file, to the 
extent it contains a form of the copyrighted work that can be 
perceived by a person or a machine, is subject to copyright.115 
A related benefit of technology neutrality, as it pertains to 
subjecting new works or uses to copyright control, is that neu-
tral defaults keep copyright-using technologies within the copy-
right system by encouraging use-specific exceptions rather than 
technology-specific exclusions.116 That, in turn, confers on an 
author greater default control over her copyrighted work and 
increases the likelihood of remuneration for new uses while 
simultaneously protecting existing commercial markets and 
technological formats. Whether this enhances social welfare is 
a popular normative debate among copyright scholars,117 albeit 
beyond this Article’s scope. But the legislative history suggests 
that Congress intended to grant authors control over new uses 
and markets.118 And, to that end, technology neutrality creates 
a presumption of copyright reaching new tech. 
However, technology neutrality discounts, if not overlooks, 
countervailing reasons to avoid future-proofing, as well as the 
downsides to treating differences alike. Significantly, technolo-
gy neutrality assumes the propriety of old laws regulating new 
technologies. Yet fading normativity and elusive neutrality, as 
detailed in this Part, make technology neutrality both subopti-
 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53–54 (1976). 
 115. Yet, for reasons discussed infra in Part III.B, it is more likely that 
even under the technology-specific 1909 Act digitally compressed music would 
have been within copyright law. 
 116. This is the 1976 Act’s default approach, though some technologies re-
ceive specific treatment.  
 117. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 46, at 1589–91 (arguing that content 
owners “clearly are not best positioned to develop” new markets, which can 
“facilitate a potential holdout, raising the transaction costs for developers of 
new media and devices and stifling innovation in the process”); Ginsburg, su-
pra note 28, at 1619 (arguing that copyright control over new markets “not on-
ly enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, but also may offer 
the public an increased quantity and variety of works of authorship”); Ray-
mond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 312–15 (2002) 
(proposing a statutory levy on “subscriptions for Internet service and the sales 
of computer, audio, and video equipment” to permit private copying without 
creating a new exception to copyright for peer-to-peer technology). 
 118. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
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mal and self-defeating. Future-proofing a statute so that it 
need not be amended in response to unforeseen technologies on-
ly embodies normative preferences to the extent norms remain 
constant—and technological development has the potential to 
shift paradigms and, in the process, displace the first principles 
that undergird the technology-neutral law. Relatedly, mandat-
ing ex ante application of the law to new technologies assumes 
that subjecting extant and future technologies to copyright lia-
bility imposes the same costs and benefits to the copyright sys-
tem and to society. This overlooks the possibility that different 
technologies warrant different treatment, mistaking equal ap-
plication for equivalence. Moreover, even when technology neu-
trality is desirable, the goals are undermined by inconsistent 
application and a statutory mindset favoring old technologies. 
These shortcomings are derivative of four conceptual “prob-
lems,” articulated below, with treating technology neutrality as 
a legislative principle. 
The consequences are numerous. Technology-neutral de-
faults have led to often exceptionally narrow (and quickly obso-
lete) conflict-specific resolutions. Rather than broadly address-
ing the social costs, benefits, and possibilities of a new 
technology, Congress has drawn technology-specific amend-
ments responsive to narrow conflicts between interested par-
ties.119 Conflict-specific resolutions contribute to what Joseph 
Liu calls “regulatory copyright”—the hallmark of which is Con-
gress’s increased “willing[ness] to intervene in the structure of 
copyright markets” with narrow amendments.120 Regulatory 
copyright, in turn, increases the complexity—and density—of 
copyright law.121 Additionally, new use-specific exceptions, cou-
 
 119. See, e.g., supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text (discussing the 
AHRA). 
 120. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 91 (2004); see 
also Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
109, 110–11 (2013) (“In both copyright and patent . . . we have seen a turn in-
creasingly towards the regulatory side of IP . . . .”). 
 121. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1637–38 (stating that copyright law’s “industry-specific 
rules and exceptions have led to a bloated, impenetrable statute that reads 
like the tax code”); Liu, supra note 120, at 89 (“Many commentators have be-
come concerned that the complexity of the code is making it more difficult for 
individuals to understand and comply with its provisions. Others have la-
mented the complexity of certain, very detailed, provisions.” (footnote omit-
ted)). But see Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito II, Measuring the 
Complexity of the Law: The United States Code 38–40 (unpublished manu-
script) (draft of Aug. 1, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
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pled with inconsistent judicial application of technology-neutral 
rights, have increased legal uncertainty.122 And, finally, the 
ways in which courts have applied the 1976 Act’s technology-
neutral provisions have often encouraged exploitation of ambi-
guity or silence in positive law.123 
A. PROBLEM OF PREDICTION 
A key shortcoming of technology neutrality stems from the 
fact that technological developments are notoriously unpredict-
able,124 and history is littered with the commercially dead re-
mains of Next Big Things. Remember Laserdiscs? There also 
are the bold claims about a technology’s lack of utility that only 
a few years later look comically myopic.125 Well-known exam-
ples include Harry Warner of Warner Bros. asking in 1927, 
“Who the hell wants to hear actors talk?”126 and the founder of 
the minicomputer manufacturer Digital Equipment Corp. say-
ing in 1977 that “there is no reason for any individual to have a 
computer in their home.”127 Notably, the father of disruptive-
 
id=2307352 (finding that of forty-nine titles of the U.S. Code, copyright law’s 
Title 17 ranks thirtieth most complex). 
 122. The volition doctrine, which limits copyright liability to an individual’s 
“volitional conduct that violates the Act,” Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2498, 2512 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting), is illustrative. The doctrine has 
been central to many cases involving new technologies that implicate the re-
production right or the public performance right, but its application has been 
inconsistent. And the Aereo majority’s silence on the doctrine further clouded 
its reach. Likewise, the scope of the distribution right and the transmission 
right with respect to new technologies have been heavily disputed, as dis-
cussed more infra Part II.B–C. 
 123. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN, supra note 53; Grant Gilmore, On Statutory 
Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461, 467 (1967); Eugene Volokh, Technology 
and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375–76 (1995). 
 125. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Technology Predictions Are Mostly Bunk, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at A15 (recounting the ten worst technology predictions 
of all time). 
 126. SCOTT KIRSNER, INVENTING THE MOVIES: HOLLYWOOD’S EPIC BATTLE 
BETWEEN INNOVATION AND THE STATUS QUO, FROM THOMAS EDISON TO STEVE 
JOBS 18 (2008). 
 127. Ken Olsen claims he was referring to computers controlling all opera-
tions in a home, not to personal computers. See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, DEC IS 
DEAD, LONG LIVE DEC: THE LASTING LEGACY OF DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPO-
RATION 53–55 (2010). But the Internet of Things has disproven even that more 
conservative prediction. See, e.g., Robert L. Mitchell, The Internet of Things at 
Home, COMPUTERWORLD (June 30, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.computerworld 
.com/article/2474727/consumerization/150407-the-internet-of-things.html 
(“The Internet of Things is changing simple homes into smart homes, where 
everything from your lights to your locks can be controlled from your 
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innovation theory predicted in 2007 “that Apple won’t succeed 
with the iPhone. . . . History speaks pretty loudly on that.”128 In 
hindsight, these miscalculations look abjectly shortsighted—
but that is an indication of how difficult it can be to predict the 
future value of true innovation.129 
The unpredictable nature of innovation compounds the 
challenges of foreseeing the technological future, particularly 
for Members of Congress, who typically lack the expertise of 
those in the field.130 Some innovations are subtle and frequent, 
like improvements to the typewriter; others are dramatic and 
paradigm shifting, like the computer processor.131 Rapid and 
sporadic innovations are much more difficult to predict because 
they defy the general human vision of the future as a linearly 
enhanced version of the present. These innovations cause ex-
 
smartphone.”). There are also numerous apocryphal stories, like the U.S. pa-
tent commissioner who purportedly resigned in 1899 because “[e]verything 
that can be invented has been invented.” See Samuel Sass, A Patently False 
Patent Myth, 13 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER 310, 311 (1989) (attributing the quote’s 
origin to a 1981 book); Dennis Crouch, Tracing the Quote: Everything that Can 
Be Invented Has Been Invented, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 6, 2011), http://patentlyo 
.com/patent/2011/01/tracing-the-quote-everything-that-can-be-invented-has 
-been-invented.html (suggesting that the quote actually originated from an 
1899 edition of Punch magazine). 
 128. Jena McGregor, Clayton Christensen’s Innovation Brain, 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 15, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-06 
-15/clayton-christensens-innovation-brainbusinessweek-business-news-stock 
-market-and-financial-advice. 
 129. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 53, at 150–51 (“[N]either manufacturers 
nor customers know how or why the products will be used, and hence do not 
know what specific features of the product will and will not ultimately be val-
ued.”). This challenge of predicting innovation is, of course, not limited to 
technology. Just ask the record company that told the Beatles they had “no 
future in show business” or the professional basketball players who thought 
the slam dunk was an unacceptable way to score. See Eddie Deezen, The Rec-
ord Company That Rejected the Beatles, NEATORAMA (Jan. 1, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.neatorama.com/2013/01/01/The-Record-Company-That-Rejected 
-The-Beatles; Evin Demirel, Secret History of the First Dunk, DAILY BEAST 
(Feb. 15, 2014, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/15/the 
-first-dunk-in-basketball.html. 
 130. Cf. Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the 
Right To Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 56 
n.234 (2011) (“Peer-to-peer technology was not even anticipated at the time 
Congress passed the DMCA in 1998.”). 
 131. See Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological Disconti-
nuities and Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 439 (1986) 
(using as case studies the minicomputer, cement, and airline industries to 
“demonstrate that technology evolves through periods of incremental change 
punctuated by technological breakthroughs that either enhance or destroy the 
competence of firms in an industry”). 
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ponential changes to their environment. And it is the rapid and 
sporadic innovations that primarily open new markets for copy-
righted works. Therein lies a core shortcoming of technology 
neutrality’s underlying principles. 
This shortcoming—what I call the problem of prediction—
is twofold. The first is implicit in the arguments favoring neu-
trality: we cannot know what future technology will look like, 
and thus the law should be drafted to adapt to the unfore-
seen.132 The other problem, related but overlooked, pushes 
against technology neutrality: we cannot predict whether ap-
plying a law to a new technology will promote—or undermine—
the law’s policy goals. In other words, Congress could not have 
known in 1976 whether copyright law should apply in exactly 
the same manner to Internet search engines when it had no vi-
sion of the World Wide Web; nor, for related reasons, could 
Congress have known how it wanted copyright law to treat 
webcasting or peer-to-peer file sharing or Internet-based audio-
visual transmissions. 
In the abstract, legislators can say that they want an un-
known B to be treated like a known A. But until B’s nature and 
capabilities are understood—until legislators have some appre-
ciation for how the law will affect B, and the attendant welfare 
costs and benefits—it is impossible to evaluate the extent to 
which the law actually should treat B like A.133 Technology neu-
trality is based on the premise that technology-neutral laws 
can adequately anticipate known unknowns. The trouble is: 
technological spikes inject unknown unknowns.134 
 
 132. This concept peppers the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 82, at 13 (“[O]f the many prob-
lems dealt with in the bill, those covered by the exclusive rights sections are 
most affected by advancing technology in all fields of communications, includ-
ing a number of future developments that can only be speculated about.”).  
 133. In many cases, the default of copyright law applying to a new technol-
ogy as it applied to old technologies has not imposed costs that undermine 
copyright policy goals—namely, the advancement of knowledge and learning. 
In other cases, as discussed in Part II.B, courts have utilized the fair use doc-
trine to provide new technologies relief from liability. But this is not always 
true. 
 134. Here I adopt former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s taxono-
my of things: “there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns . . . .” 
DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 
(Feb. 12, 2002, 11:30 AM), http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript 
.aspx?transcriptid=2636; see also Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 
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Moreover, when Congress attempts to draft laws with an 
eye toward an unknown future, it does so from the vantage 
point of contemporary technological limitations,135 crafting 
technology-neutral laws with extant technology in mind.136 Like 
the nineteenth-century farmer who imagines a sharper plow 
but is unable to foresee the combustion engine, Congress ima-
gines linear advances from extant technology.137 Thus, laws 
theoretically tailored to known unknowns—in a world of un-
known unknowns—are, in fact, based on known knowns. 
Within the rubric of known knowns, Congress might see no 
harm in courts applying copyright law to a new technology in 
exactly the manner courts apply copyright law to extant tech-
nology.138 But the arrival of the Internet—and with it the de-
mocratization of authorship, the digitization of everything, and 
the disappearance of physical copies—complicates the calculus. 
The Internet, like the combustion engine to the farmer, is a 
technological discontinuity—a rapid spike on the timeline of 
innovation that moves the future of technology onto a new 
plane.139 And the principles underlying the law, whether tech-
nology specific or neutral, are disrupted. 
Copyright’s lack of appreciation for the unknown un-
knowns is visible in the delineation of copyright’s exclusive 
 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1018 (2014) (using this concept of known unknowns 
and unknown unknowns in the context of cybersecurity). 
 135. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
130–31 (1982). 
 136. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy 
Law, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 24, 28 (2012) (“Time and again we realize that a 
law that seemed to be technology-neutral at one point (usually the time of its 
legislation), is in fact based on a particular technology, albeit in a general 
manner. We often realize the technological mindset that is embedded in the 
law only once a new technological paradigm replaces the previous one.”). 
 137. Cf. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 128–31 (1982) (arguing that innovation is a 
process of trial and error); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 111 (2010) (“General 
human ignorance about the future leads to a great many human errors.”). 
 138. This is related to the problem of the penumbra, discussed further in-
fra Part II.B. 
 139. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1275, 1279 (2002) (“While the law has lagged behind technologi-
cal developments in the past, the Internet seems to present challenges of an 
entirely different order.”). See generally Philip Anderson & Michael L. 
Tushman, Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical 
Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604, 605 (1990) (discussing 
“when and how dominant designs emerge from technological discontinuities”); 
Tushman & Anderson, supra note 131 (discussing “patterns of technological 
change”). 
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rights. Beyond the scope of rights being too broadly applied to 
some unforeseen technologies, the rationale for separating ex-
clusive rights into six categorical rights has broken down as 
technology has advanced. In particular, the distribution right 
found in Section 106(3)140 and the public performance right in 
Section 106(4)141 evince an antiquated understanding of com-
munications technologies—one that ignores the way digital 
technologies bundle the rights. Section 106(3) applies to both 
distribution of physical copies and digital downloads; Section 
106(4) prohibits the transmission or streaming of a copyrighted 
work in public or to the public. This made sense in 1976 be-
cause reproduction and distribution were one business, and 
public performance was another. That no longer is true. Moreo-
ver, as Jane Ginsburg has noted, “that approach assumes that 
it is possible today, and more importantly, will remain possible 
tomorrow, to ascertain what is a stream and what is a down-
load.”142 Indeed, as the Second Circuit stated in United States v. 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, “under 
certain circumstances . . . a transmission could constitute both 
a stream and a download, each of which implicates a different 
right of the copyright holder.”143 
The facts in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc. further called into question the distinctness of the 
different exclusive rights. The Court only addressed the public 
performance right, but a counterfactual demonstrates that cop-
yright’s exclusive rights are borne of a technological mindset. 
That technological mindset, which explains the division of the 
exclusive rights, hinders copyright law’s ability to reach sub-
stantively equivalent technologies and business models. Imag-
ine that rather than stream content to a subscriber, Aereo 
communicated an inert file to the subscriber’s computer. When 
the subscriber later opens the file and watches the content, 
Aereo no longer would be liable for infringing the copyright 
owner’s public performance right because the communication 
was not simultaneously viewable or audible, as required by the 
statute. Copyright control then would shift to the distribution 
right in Section 106(3), but if Aereo made copies at the direc-
tion of users, would a distribution actually have occurred? If 
not, then the copyright question would turn to the reproduction 
 
 140. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 141. Id. § 106(4). 
 142. Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 9. 
 143. 627 F.3d 64, 74 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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right. Such piecemeal regulation, beyond being unprincipled, 
invites technological manipulation designed to skirt liability 
while engaging in practices that do not conform to the spirit of 
the law.144 
In light of these predictive limitations, Congress cannot be 
expected to really know whether the law should apply to a yet 
unknown technology. And by choosing technology neutrality, it 
creates a false sense that the law can avoid general overhaul. 
B. PROBLEM OF THE PENUMBRA 
Moreover, by dictating per se inclusion of new technologies 
within an existing statute’s ambit, technology neutrality ampli-
fies the general jurisprudential challenge of determining what 
the law governs and whether it should. New technologies add 
new wrinkles to the law’s application. Interacting with the 
problem of prediction, the law’s ability to speak clearly to pro-
scribed behavior becomes more muddled over time. 
This is technology neutrality’s problem of the penumbra. 
The shortcoming can be better understood by considering 
H.L.A. Hart’s canonical illustration of interpretative challeng-
es: “A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public 
park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicy-
cles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are 
these, as we say, to be called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the 
rule or not?”145 
The hypothetical is short, as is the rule: no vehicles in the 
park. But the application is anything but simple or straight-
forward. In a debate with Lon Fuller146 that has spawned an 
immense literature,147 Hart said the easy cases are those involv-
ing the rule’s “core” (i.e., automobiles); more difficult are those 
possibly belonging in the partially obscured “penumbra” (e.g., 
bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles, airplanes).148 
Hart’s hypothetical invites innumerable variations. What 
about an ambulance, for example? Clearly, an ambulance is a 
vehicle, but in an emergency should it not be permitted to enter 
 
 144. See infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
 145. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 146. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958). 
 147. See Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1111 n.10 (2008) (summarizing the literature). 
 148. Hart, supra note 145. 
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the park? Or what to make of the commonly accepted definition 
of a vehicle—“a machine that is used to carry people or goods 
from one place to another”149—not covering all automobiles 
(e.g., an inert car) yet implicating conveyances that could not 
reasonably be within the proscription (e.g., a baby stroller)? 
Other variations likewise raise doubt about whether the law 
will apply or should apply; each increases the penumbra of un-
certainty. And the penumbra generally is unavoidable, even at 
the moment a law is enacted, because laws cannot reasonably 
be drafted to explicitly speak to every possibly relevant scenar-
io. 
Interpreting statutory language is a challenge with all 
types of legislation. But it is more problematic with a technolo-
gy-neutral law because the penumbra expands as the law ages. 
There are two reasons. First, a law drafted for future technolo-
gies typically must speak in broader generalities than a tech-
nology-specific law. For example, the vehicles-in-the-park pro-
hibition has in mind certain bounds of the word “vehicle.” This 
latent definition is based on accepted meaning, and that, in 
turn, is shaped by technological limitations. As technology ad-
vances, that definition changes and new “vehicles” fall into the 
law’s penumbra of uncertainty. (For example, is a Segway a ve-
hicle? What about a drone? Does it matter if the drone carries 
only a camera for surveillance or if it is delivering beer?) In 
contrast, a technology-specific law—e.g., No Skateboards—is 
less prone to penumbral enlargement. 
Similarly, the 1976 Act’s grant of control over transmis-
sions to the public is based on unstated assumptions about the 
types of technology capable of transmitting copyrighted works 
to the public. Congress did not envision communication tech-
nologies that could transmit the exact same content to large 
numbers of people via copies and channels unique to each audi-
ence member.150 Thus, it was unclear whether Aereo infringed 
the broadcasters’ public performance right when it rebroadcast 
to an individual subscriber a copy made only for that subscrib-
er. Was Aereo transmitting to an audience of one or to an audi-
ence of everyone viewing any copy of the same content? Courts 
 
 149. Vehicle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/  
dictionary (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 
 150. The former is typically a sufficient but not necessary element of public 
performance; the latter is a hallmark of private performance. 
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disagreed151 and three Supreme Court justices, dissenting from 
the majority opinion holding that Aereo infringed Section 
106(4),152 countered that the statute did not speak to Aereo’s 
technology.153 Whereas the 1976 Act was enacted with a pe-
numbra of uncertainty around what qualified as “the public” (is 
the threshold two people or fifty?) or as a transmission (must it 
actually be seen by anyone?), new technologies, like Aereo, en-
large the area of uncertainty by creating questions that legisla-
tors did not imagine were technologically possible.  
The second reason the penumbra is more problematic is 
that technology neutrality, counterintuitively, causes the law to 
ossify. Though one of the core purposes of technology neutrality 
is future-proofing,154 that goal presumes that technology-
neutral laws actually adapt well to change. When they do not, 
legislators may be left with the false impression that the law 
need not be updated. That helps explain why updating copy-
right law has been such a piecemeal process, one of conflict res-
olution rather than holistic review—pain management rather 
than restorative treatment.155 
The questions raised by the penumbra cannot be answered 
as “a matter of logical deduction” and, thus, if rational, must be 
grounded in something else.156 Instead, whether the law applies 
to a case in the penumbral area must be answered by positing 
 
 151. See Cmty. Television of Utah, L.L.C. v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 
1202 (D. Utah 2014) (finding that Aereo infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights); Am. 
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding 
that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of infringement); see also Fox Televi-
sion Sys., Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., P.L.C., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 
(C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that defendant’s technology, which is materially simi-
lar to Aereo’s, infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FilmOn X L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (same, though only 
finding a likelihood of infringement in granting a preliminary injunction). 
 152. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
 153. Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is not the role of this Court to 
identify and plug loop-holes. It is the role of good lawyers to identify and ex-
ploit them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes. Congress 
can do that, I may add, in a much more targeted, better informed, and less 
disruptive fashion than the crude ‘looks-like-cable-TV’ solution the Court in-
vents today.”). 
 154. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 155. The political landscape also helps explain the lack of a major overhaul. 
See S.A. Miller & Stephen Dinan, Gridlock in Congress Rekindled Quickly De-
spite Democrat, Republican Calls for Cooperation, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/7/gridlock-in-congress 
-rekindled-quickly-despite-dem. 
 156. Hart, supra note 145, at 607–08. 
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“some concept of what the law ought to be.”157 And determining 
what the law should be requires evaluating whether the situa-
tion is of the kind that the law seeks to prohibit. That involves 
drawing lines and making value judgments,158 even though—
maybe particularly because—the statute claims to be neutral.159 
Even when courts look to statutory text, judges (like scholars) 
cannot distill exactly what Congress meant.160 That, in turn, 
leads to a deeper exploration of the legislative history. All in 
the interest of addressing whether the law answers a question 
Congress was not asked.161 
There is, however, a way to try to slow the penumbra’s 
growth: draft the law to apply prospectively to all future tech-
nology. Though technology neutrality is frequently spoken of as 
flexible like a legal standard,162 the 1976 Act posited an 
overinclusive rule that expands to encompass, rather than 
adapt to, new technology. (Laws generally fall along a rules-
standards spectrum163: rules are more expensive to devise but 
are easier to apply and provide parties with greater adjudica-
tive certainty; standards are cheaper to devise and lend them-
selves to greater fairness and flexibility but their application is 
more difficult and inconsistent.164) A law that adapts to new 
 
 157. Id. at 608. 
 158. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 466–72 
(1892) (acknowledging that the Court was interpreting the Alien Contract La-
bor Act with Christian values in mind). 
 159. More on the pretense of neutrality infra Part II.D. 
 160. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes, 
21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 583, 593 (1984) (“Words do not interpret themselves. A sen-
tence will never mean exactly the same thing to any two different people or 
even the same thing to one person on different occasions.”); see also id. at 594 
(“Courts that shield themselves behind descriptions of law as clear, predeter-
mined and objective norms against which they pitch their neutral decisions 
are worthy of suspicion.”). 
 161. Cf. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., 
concurring) (“As nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those 
who uttered the words, and try to divine how they would have dealt with the 
unforeseen situation . . . .”). 
 162. See, e.g., Birnhack, supra note 136, at 38 (“[T]echnology-neutral laws 
are equivalent to standards and the technology-specific laws are equivalent to 
rules.”); Kerr, supra note 62, at 1016 (“New facts will trigger new rules, but 
the role of the [Fourth Amendment] should remain constant regardless of 
technology.”). 
 163. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 561 n.6 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 953, 963–64 (1995). 
 164. The classic example is between a rule that prohibits drivers on the 
highway from exceeding fifty-five miles per hour and a standard that prohibits 
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technologies over time must be designed to evaluate whether, 
and if so how, the law applies to a new technology. But the 
1976 Copyright Act’s technology-neutral provisions do not ena-
ble such ad hoc determinations. Judges are given no factors to 
consider when deciding whether copyright law applies. The 
statute dictates that copyright applies.165 Yet, the penumbra 
still exists and expands, albeit more slowly, and thus judges 
still must determine what Congress meant the law to be. Over 
time, a broadly inclusive technology-neutral law’s tailoring to 
the practices it governs becomes more tenuous, and, signifi-
cantly, a different penumbra of uncertainty expands: whether 
the law should apply. 
Increasingly, judges have suggested that, in some cases, 
the costs to innovation, and by extension social welfare, would 
be too severe if the technologist were not free from copyright li-
ability and have leaned heavily on fair use.166 Accordingly, the 
doctrine has taken on an outsized role, expanding to provide 
“breathing space”167—not just as it historically had done for new 
creative expression, but also now for new technological innova-
tions.168 That, in turn, increases uncertainty about how the law 
will apply. 
This judicial phenomenon began to take shape with the 
Betamax case.169 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
 
driving at an unreasonable speed. For a concise and recent discussion of the 
rules-standards tradeoffs, see Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional 
Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2011); see also id. at 15 n.56 (providing “a 
very small sampling of the rich literature exploring rules and standards gen-
erally”). 
 165. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 166. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasizing the social value of Google Books), aff’d, 804 F.3d 
202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 167. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 168. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 1389–91; Edward Lee, Technological 
Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 823–24 (2010) (discussing the importance of 
breathing room for technological development); Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use 
As Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 840–41 (2008); Matthew 
Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use 
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 384 (2005) (discussing 
how fair use facilitated broader initial rights being vested in authors and “pre-
serve[d] copyright’s ability to adapt to new technology”). 
 169. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
Betamax, like the peer-to-peer file-sharing cases discussed infra notes 208–25 
and accompanying text, concerned secondary liability based on common law 
doctrines. Though secondary liability is not defined in the 1976 Act, it is predi-
cated upon a primary infringement, which does arise from an exclusive right 
found in Section 106. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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Studios Inc., television broadcasters and studios claimed that 
Sony’s Betamax personal videocassette recorder infringed their 
copyrights by enabling users to copy television programs with-
out permission.170 A five to four Supreme Court held that Sony 
was not secondarily liable for copyright infringement by fash-
ioning, from patent law, the now-famous “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine, which stated that the manufacturer of a 
device capable of infringing uses is not secondarily liable if the 
device is capable of a “substantial noninfringing use.”171 
The Court’s mitigating liability for Sony was contingent 
upon determining that consumer “time-shifting”—by which an 
individual records a program to watch at a non-televised time—
was a substantial noninfringing use.172 The majority did so by 
refusing to accept that Congress intended for copyright law to 
regulate private copying on videocassette recorders.173 After all, 
that would have meant that millions of Americans were in-
fringing copyrights.174 In apparent rejection of the principles of 
technology neutrality, and by reference to new-technology cases 
decided under the technology-specific 1790, 1870, and 1909 
copyright statutes, the Supreme Court declared that Congress 
must determine whether it wants copyright law to cover vide-
ocassette recorders now that the technology is known175: 
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to 
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for 
copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and 
the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations 
of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new 
technology.  
  In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our 
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights cre-
ated by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a cal-
culus of interests.176 
The concerns are understandable, but practical policy does 
not refute Justice Blackmun’s argument, in dissent, that Con-
gress already had plainly marked the course by “chang[ing] the 
old pattern and enact[ing] a statute that would cover new tech-
nologies, as well as old.”177 Rather, it demonstrates that the 
 
 170. 464 U.S. at 420. 
 171. Id. at 442. 
 172. Id. at 456. 
 173. Id. at 454. 
 174. Id. at 456. 
 175. Id. at 430–31. 
 176. Id. at 431. 
 177. Id. at 457–58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Court was concerned about the implications of Congress’s ex 
ante technology-neutral approach.178 The Supreme Court reit-
erated this concern in Aereo by noting the Transmit Clause’s 
breadth and stating, without discussion, that, though not be-
fore the court, “the doctrine of ‘fair use’ can help to prevent in-
appropriate or inequitable applications.”179 
Related judicial treatment of the 1976 Act’s expansiveness 
can be seen in Judge Chin’s opinion in Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
Google Inc., holding that the wholesale copying of millions of in-
copyright books by Google for its Book Search project is a fair 
use and therefore does not infringe the authors’ copyrights.180 
The fair use doctrine, as codified by Section 107, directs judges 
to consider whether excusing an unauthorized use would fur-
ther copyright policy goals.181 And Judge Chin did so by includ-
ing a long discussion of the benefits of Google Book Search;182 
he completed his fair use analysis with a normative assertion: 
Google Books provides significant public benefits. It advances the 
progress of the arts and sciences, while maintaining respectful con-
sideration for the rights of authors and other creative individuals, and 
without adversely impacting the rights of copyright holders. It has 
become an invaluable research tool that permits students, teachers, 
librarians, and others to more efficiently identify and locate books. It 
has given scholars the ability, for the first time, to conduct full-text 
searches of tens of millions of books. It preserves books, in particular 
out-of-print and old books that have been forgotten in the bowels of 
libraries, and it gives them new life. It facilitates access to books for 
print-disabled and remote or underserved populations. It generates 
new audiences and creates new sources of income for authors and 
publishers. Indeed, all society benefits.183 
In other words, Judge Chin felt that the welfare costs of 
subjecting Google Book Search to copyright liability made en-
forcement unreasonable: Google’s unauthorized copying must 
be excused. 
 
 178. Cf. Andrew Tutt, Textualism and the Equity of the Copyright Act: Re-
flections Inspired by American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2014) (arguing that though “[t]he enactors of the 
Copyright Act certainly would have thought that the ‘over-engineered[,]’ ‘Rube 
Goldberg-like contrivance’ should be sacrificed to the copyright gods,” doing so 
would undermine copyright policy values). 
 179. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
 180. 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 181. See Greenberg, supra note 45, at 106–08. 
 182. Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88. 
 183. Id. at 293 (emphasis added). To be sure, Judge Chin also found that 
the four statutory factors weigh “in favor of a finding of fair use.” Id. 
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Technology neutrality also is an element of Canadian copy-
right law, and played an important role in five copyright cases 
that the Canadian Supreme Court decided in July 2012.184 
Looking at these cases, Carys Craig indirectly offers a possible 
explanation for the dramatic expansion of the fair use doctrine 
in U.S. copyright law.185 Craig posits that, in Canada, a third 
purpose of technology neutrality is serving as a basis for main-
taining the copyright owner-user balance that has three centu-
ries of analog development—and thereby as a justification for 
“circumscribing the potential reach of existing owners’ rights 
where their extension threatens to upset copyright’s fragile 
balance in the digital domain.”186 Conceptually, something simi-
lar could be happening with the judicial expansion of the fair 
use doctrine for new technologies, though, to be sure, the 1976 
Copyright Act is silent on whether fair use is to be technology 
neutral or technology specific. 
The interaction between neutrality amplifying uncertainty 
and courts’ increasingly heavy reliance on fair use has resulted 
in an awkward dance. Authors initially receive broad rights, 
which presumably factored into ex ante incentives, but courts 
subsequently reduce entitlements ex post. One consequence is 
that copyright owners are increasingly displeased with copy-
right law and, in turn, are lobbying Congress to revise the law. 
On the other hand, when use-specific exceptions are denied, 
technologists are the ones who push law reform. Both scenarios 
undermine the premise that technology neutrality can promote 
statutory longevity. 
C. PROBLEM OF PERSPECTIVE 
Beyond courts choosing to not apply technology-neutral 
laws in an equivalent manner to future technologies because of 
normative concerns, the nature of the 1976 Act hinders judges 
 
 184. See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231; Rogers Comms. Inc. v. Soc’y of Com-
posers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 283; Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 
326; Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access 
Copyright), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345; Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Ass’ns of 
Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 376. 
 185. See Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purpos-
es of Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY, supra note 63, at 271–72. 
Her claim is indirect because it is broader and because Canadian copyright 
law lacks the fair use doctrine; instead, it has the analog of fair dealing. 
 186. Id. at 299. 
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from applying the law to new technologies in a consistent man-
ner. Discrepancies appear both within and across technologies. 
It is not enough to say that a law applies to a new technology in 
the same manner it applied to the old technology when the new 
technology might present a secondary locus of inquiry. A close 
examination shows that incongruences in content-technology 
disputes often turn on how a court conceptualizes the relevant 
technology and whether the court looks to mechanical limita-
tions—the structure and process of the technological system—
or only to the technological byproduct. That is, judges often 
formalistically adjudge a technology as infringing or 
noninfringing without looking at what the technology accom-
plishes; instead, judges often look at how the technology oper-
ates. 
This is the problem of perspective187—the distortion that 
occurs when new technologies introduce a new locus of inquiry. 
The 1976 Act’s instruction to treat new technology as legally 
equivalent to old technology creates such a problem.188 The 
structural perspective in copyright law looks inside the ma-
chine at the technological design or process; the behavioral per-
spective looks only at the technological output—at what, not 
how. Inconsistent judicial treatment of new technologies sug-
gests that courts are not answering the same question when 
determining when and how copyright law applies to a new 
technology. Put another way: different judges have different 
perspectives on the universe of material facts. And, in many 
cases, that perspective determines the applicable copyright doc-
trine, if any, and whether it is adverse to the technology. 
The recent litigation over broadcast retransmitter Aereo 
demonstrates how legal outcomes at times hinge on different 
foci in evaluating the same technology. Courts in different cir-
cuits split over whether Aereo’s technology made a public per-
formance of copyrighted content and thereby infringed the 
Transmit Clause in Section 106(4).189 A key question for some 
judges was why Aereo used thousands of dime-sized personal 
 
 187. The idea that new technologies can introduce parallel perspectives 
was first articulated by Orin Kerr in the context of cyberlaw. See Orin S. Kerr, 
The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003). He 
argued that perspective often is legally determinative and “many of the major 
disputes within the field of ‘cyberlaw’ boil down to clashes between internal 
and external perspectives.” Id. 
 188. The problem of perspective can exist in other laws, but it is particular-
ly problematic in technology-neutral laws because it undermines equivalence. 
 189. See cases cited supra note 151. 
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antennae rather than a single antenna like the kind used for 
cable retransmission.190 Was there a technological benefit or 
was it a copyright workaround?191 For other judges, Aereo’s ra-
tionale was irrelevant; what mattered was that the personal-
antenna technology ensured that every transmission, to these 
judges, was privately performed.192 That is, the personal anten-
nae made thousands of personal copies of each captured pro-
gram, thereby enabling Aereo to transmit thousands of one-to-
one performances to specific subscribers; a single antenna ei-
ther would have made these performances public in real time 
or would have subjected them to the single-copy aggregation 
exception in transmission.193  
A divided panel of the Second Circuit illustrates the struc-
tural and behavioral perspectives194—and how the choice of per-
spective undermines the premise of technology neutrality. The 
panel majority found significant that Aereo assigned each sub-
scriber a personal antenna: 
The feed from that antenna is not used to generate multiple copies of 
each program for different Aereo users but rather only one copy: the 
copy that can be watched by the user to whom that antenna is as-
signed. Thus even if we were to disregard Aereo’s copies, it would still 
be true that the potential audience of each of Aereo’s transmissions 
was the single user to whom each antenna was assigned.195 
The individual antennae, the court said, made the trans-
missions to each subscriber akin to the uncontrovertibly private 
transmission of an antenna placed on top of each subscriber’s 
home.196 And because that antenna is individual to the sub-
scriber, “the entire chain of transmission from the time a signal 
is first received by Aereo to the time it generates an image the 
Aereo user sees has a potential audience of only one Aereo cus-
 
 190. See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(Chin, J., dissenting). 
 191. There is a third possibility: the thousands of antennae represented a 
technologically beneficial copyright workaround. See Dan L. Burk, Inventing 
Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2015). 
 192. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 193. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Why Johnny Can’t Stream: How Video Cop-
yright Went Insane, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/ 
tech-policy/2012/08/why-johnny-cant-stream-how-video-copyright-went-insane/ 
2 (“Pause to note what a silly distinction this is.”). 
 194. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 676 (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion in part because transmissions of “live” Internet broadcasts likely were not 
public performances). 
 195. Id. at 693. 
 196. Id. 
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tomer.”197 By closely inspecting Aereo’s technology, the court 
found no way that Aereo could be infringing the Transmit 
Clause, regardless of how Aereo’s service appeared from a thir-
ty-thousand-foot view that saw only the technological output.198 
In contrast, Judge Chin’s dissent looked beyond Aereo’s 
technology, which he characterized as “a sham”—“a Rube Gold-
berg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid 
the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a per-
ceived loophole in the law.”199 He criticized the majority for fo-
cusing on Aereo’s technical architecture and, thereby, 
“elevat[ing] form over substance.”200 Arguing that Aereo in-
fringed the broadcasters’ copyrights, Judge Chin concentrated 
on the nature of Aereo’s technology-based service, on the prod-
uct it delivers; not on the path it travels.201 Moreover, Judge 
Chin argued that the broad language of the 1976 Act covers 
“any device or process,” and that included Aereo’s technology.202 
Whether Aereo used one antenna or one million was irrelevant. 
“Because Aereo is transmitting television signals to paying 
strangers, all of its transmissions are ‘to the public,’ even if in-
tervening ‘device[s] or process[es]’ limit the potential audience 
of each separate transmission to a single ‘member[] of the pub-
lic.’”203 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding 
that Aereo infringed Section 106(4) because, based on its tech-
nological output, Aereo resembled a cable-like system.204 The 
Court focused on the purpose of the 1976 Act, specifically Con-
gress’s stated intent to abrogate prior Supreme Court decisions 
holding that cable companies did not perform copyrighted 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 696. 
 199. Id. at 697. Not surprisingly, Aereo proclaimed that its business model 
was devised to avoid copyright liability. See Brian Fung, Aereo: Yes, We’re a 
Rube Goldberg Device. And We’re Proud of It., WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/03/27/aereo-yes 
-were-a-rube-goldberg-device-and-were-proud-of-it (“Exploiting loopholes is the 
whole point, the company says.”). 
 200. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697. 
 201. Id. at 704–05. 
 202. Id. at 698 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (emphasis in opinion). 
 203. Id. at 699; see also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 512 
(2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Courts should follow Congress’s lead and 
resist the urge to look ‘under the hood’ at how these processes technically 
work.”), denying reh’g en banc of 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) . 
 204. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
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works and were thus outside the 1909 Act’s reach.205 Despite 
Aereo’s aim to technologically manipulate all performances to 
be private, the Court explicitly stated that traditional cable re-
transmission systems and Aereo’s one-to-one system were effec-
tively equivalent. Technological variations, the Court said, 
were irrelevant because “[t]hey concern the behind-the-scenes 
way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its 
viewers’ screens.”206 The Supreme Court’s decision approxi-
mates a behavioral perspective, though it is colored by other 
perspectives: defendant’s purpose and viewer’s experience.207 
Additionally, the problem of perspective, to the extent it 
invites structural inquiries, even if inconsistent, pushes techno-
logical innovation toward exploiting legal ambiguity or silence. 
Peer-to-peer litigation tells the story of how iterative technolo-
gies might be designed in an effort to skirt liability while facili-
tating proscribed activities.208 Napster, Aimster, and 
Grokster—three early peer-to-peer file-sharing services—
varied technologically but offered the same general service: en-
abling a user to share a file in his possession with other users 
who wanted a copy. The services were “[p]erhaps the most con-
spicuous attack on property rights” to emerge in the digital 
age,209 used overwhelmingly for the unauthorized sharing of 
copyright-protected music,210 which the recording industry ve-
hemently opposed on numerous fronts. One front was litigation, 
and, despite effectively similar technology, Napster,211 
Aimster,212 and Grokster213 each lost on a different basis. 
 
 205. Id. at 2504–07 (discussing Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)) (“Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those 
of the [community antenna television] companies that Congress amended the 
Act to reach.”). 
 206. Id. at 2508. 
 207. Id. (stating that technological variations “do not render Aereo’s com-
mercial objective any different from that of cable companies”). 
 208. See generally REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFT-
WARE LITIGATION (2011). 
 209. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND 
WHAT WE OWN 279 (2011). 
 210. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 806 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (noting “evidence . . . suggesting that almost 15 billion files 
were downloaded by Napster users” during a nine-month period); A&M Rec-
ords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“Approx-
imately 10,000 music files are shared per second using Napster . . . .”). 
 211. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 212. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 213. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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The saga began with the Ninth Circuit holding Napster 
secondarily liable for copyright infringement.214 Central to the 
court’s decision was that Napster had reasonable knowledge of 
infringing file-sharing and had the right and ability to prevent 
such activity; the former was a key element of contributory lia-
bility, the latter of vicarious liability. Both turned on Napster’s 
technological design, which contained a central index that us-
ers searched for files they wanted to copy.215 But focusing on 
knowledge and control had the unintended consequence of mo-
tivating other file-sharing services to design systems lacking 
those elements without putting in place features to limit the in-
fringing uses that drove the Napster litigation. Aimster re-
sponded to Napster’s legal troubles by distributing encryption 
software that all users needed to share files. (Though the Sev-
enth Circuit still held Aimster liable because it intentionally 
“blinded itself” in an effort to skirt liability where it otherwise 
knew it existed,216 the Court suggested that encryption technol-
ogy could shield from liability a peer-to-peer service that lacked 
“actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the ser-
vice is being used.”217) Grokster, promoting itself as an alterna-
tive to Napster, met the same fate but on a distinct legal ba-
sis.218 Unlike Napster, Grokster did not use a central server or 
index; using the Grokster software, computers communicated 
with each other through supernode indexing computers.219 Un-
like Aimster, Grokster did not encrypt peer-to-peer files; 
Grokster “use[d] no servers to intercept the content of the 
search requests or to mediate the file transfers conducted by 
users of the software,”220 and thereby did not know when files 
were copied. Thus, the Supreme Court could not find Grokster 
liable for contributory infringement, unless on the basis of will-
ful blindness; vicarious liability also was unlikely.221 According-
 
 214. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020, 1024. 
 215. However, users did not upload files to Napster’s central server. Files 
remained on a user’s computer until another user requested them. That com-
munication was routed through the central server.  
 216. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. 
 217. Id. at 650–51. 
 218. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925–26. The case also involved Streamcast’s sim-
ilar Morpheus peer-to-peer software. The following discussion applies to both, 
but I reference only Grokster for simplicity. 
 219. Id. at 921. 
 220. Id. at 922. 
 221. The Court declined to analyze vicarious liability, id. at 930 n.9, but 
control was lacking and it is unlikely that the Court would have found 
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ly, the Court looked to a record “replete” with evidence that 
Grokster sought “to satisfy a known source of demand for copy-
right infringement”222 and decided to adopt from patent law the 
inducement of infringement doctrine.223 
In each case, the court was concerned that a peer-to-peer 
technology facilitated materially similar infringement on a 
“massive scale.”224 However, because technological designs var-
ied, the courts thought that different legal doctrines must ap-
ply, regardless of whether those variations had any practical 
effect on infringing uses. Each decision provided a later-mover 
with a blueprint for avoiding copyright liability—for “ex-
ploit[ing] the gaps between technological possibilities and the 
self-described boundaries of law”225—without guarding against 
the very infringement that led to liability in the earlier case(s). 
And all without serving the societal interests that Congress 
presumed when it declared that copyright law would apply to 
all future copyright-using technologies.  
In the 1976 Act, the statutory language and legislative his-
tory are not explicit about the proper perspective. But, against 
the backdrop of technology neutrality’s general principles, the 
nature of the 1976 Act’s default rights and the legislative histo-
ry suggest that Congress generally wanted judges to adopt a 
behavioral perspective, to focus on technological output, not 
process or design. That was how Congress, in the words of Jus-
tice Blackmun, intended to “change the old pattern and enact a 
statute that would cover new technologies, as well as old.”226 I 
give this matter full consideration elsewhere.227 
More generally, though in technology-neutral laws the 
problem of perspective can be mitigated with explicit statutory 
language about the proper perspective, the specter of the prob-
lem likely will remain. Even assuming that a statute indicated 
 
Grokster’s decentralized network to rise to the level of the willful blindness in 
Aimster. 
 222. Id. at 938–39. 
 223. Id. at 936–37. 
 224. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 
2002); see supra note 31. 
 225. Depoorter, supra note 28, at 1864; see also Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003) (“The programmer is not unlike the tax 
lawyer, exploiting differences between stated goals of the law, and its legal or 
practical limits. He targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes . . . .”). 
 226. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457–
58 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 227. See Greenberg, supra note 15. 
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a behavioral perspective and that courts consistently eschewed 
the structural perspective, some courts might alter the behav-
ioral perspective as the Aereo Court seemed to do, imbuing up-
on it additional lenses such as the technologist’s “commercial 
purpose” and the viewer’s experience.228 This raises concerns 
about whether neutrality is even possible. 
D. PROBLEM OF PRETENSE 
The 1976 Act, as enacted, included several technology-
specific provisions, indicating that Congress did not actually 
believe all technologies should be treated the same—but those 
provisions are not the only non-neutral aspects of the statute. 
The technology-neutral provisions are not, in fact, neutral ei-
ther.229 A neutral law is said to be impartial and unbiased in 
application,230 but technology neutrality has earlier steps: the 
legislative process that crafts the boundaries of technology-
neutral provisions and the interpretative construction that re-
duces content-technology conflicts to legal controversies.231 Nei-
ther process is neutral; both are shaped by social and political 
context.232 This is technology neutrality’s problem of pretense—
it holds out neutrality as neutral. 
A technology-neutral statute’s step zero begins with choos-
ing the technologies to which a neutral law will be applied. For 
example, copyright law might be broadly or narrowly inclusive 
of new technologies. Does technology neutrality mean every 
technology now known or later developed? Or every communi-
cations technology now known or later developed? Or every 
communications technology with X, Y, and Z characteristics, 
 
 228. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 229. That purportedly neutral laws are laden with values is a classic claim 
of the critical legal studies movement. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983); see also James 
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985); Jonathan Turley, Introduction: The Hitchhiker’s 
Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 593 (1987). Sur-
prisingly, this claim had not, to my knowledge, been extended to technology 
neutrality. 
 230. See, e.g., Neutral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 231. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Crimi-
nal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 592 (1981). 
 232. And as Jessica Litman has shown, the broad terms that formed the 
1976 Act’s technology-neutral provisions were driven by the incumbent-parties 
negotiation process that characterized the revision. Litman, supra note 28, at 
281. 
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now known or later developed? Choosing among the options re-
flects different beliefs about the role of copyright law in protect-
ing authors and enabling technologists. The legislative history 
of the 1976 Act is overt about Congress’s value-laden goals for 
technology neutrality: it sought to grant authors control over 
new markets, to protect the author against “his copyright 
los[ing] much of its value because of unforeseen technical ad-
vances.”233 Congress therefore chose broad terms and per se in-
clusion of future technologies. 
That is an understandable decision—the propriety of which 
invokes the discussion in Part I about utilitarian copyright—
but it is not neutral. The choice of perspective also is illustra-
tive. Legislators (or, in the absence of statutory clarity, courts) 
can adopt a structural perspective or behavioral perspective (or 
something else). That decision is based, at least in part, on 
whether the decisionmaker thinks that the law should pro-
scribe disfavored technological processes or technological out-
puts.234 Similarly, how judges answer penumbral questions is 
shaped by non-neutral values.235 
More importantly, because laws regulating unforeseen 
technologies are drafted with extant technologies in mind, neu-
tral application might, in fact, discriminate against a new 
technology. That would seem to undermine technology neutral-
ity’s goal of doctrinal equivalence. For example, the Supreme 
Court in Aereo said that Congress drafted Section 106(4) to cov-
er “an entity that acts like a CATV [cable] system.”236 The Court 
found that Aereo looked like a cable system, but the Court ex-
plicitly refused to address the implications of its ruling on re-
lated technology.237 At a high level of abstraction, Aereo was 
 
 233. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 82, at 14. 
 234. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 827, 852 (1988) (stating, in the context of “means-ends rationality” that 
“[t]he choice between alternative legal rules often depends on deciding which 
one makes a better fit to some underlying legal goal”); Adrian Vermeule, In-
terpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (“Interpretive choice is a 
choice among possible means to attain stipulated ends.”). 
 235. See supra notes 156–60. 
 236. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014). 
 237. Id. at 2510–11 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the 
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to tech-
nologies not before us. We agree with the Solicitor General that ‘[q]uestions 
involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not 
before the Court, as to which “Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,” 
should await a case in which they are squarely presented.’”); see also Rebecca 
Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need To Talk About Aereo: New Contro-
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another broadcast retransmitter, the type of unforeseen tech-
nology that Congress could have had in mind when debating 
Section 106(4). But upon closer review, Aereo also looks like a 
very different technology that would have been much further 
removed from Congress’s imagination: cloud computing ser-
vices like Dropbox. If cloud computing is like Aereo and Aereo 
is like cable systems, should Section 106(4) apply the same to 
cloud computing as to early cable technologies? Or would doing 
so actually discriminate against cloud computing, thereby un-
dermining technology neutrality? 
The problem of pretense is unlike the discriminatory na-
ture of technology specificity. Its discrimination, if normative, 
is inadvertent, not tailored to policy goals. In some areas tech-
nology neutrality runs the risk of entrenching existing markets 
and handicapping more efficient or dynamic technologies.238 In 
copyright law, for example, technology neutrality entangles 
granting authors exclusive control over exploitation of their 
work with protecting existing markets from new markets of ex-
ploitation—and that imposes social costs without necessarily 
conferring benefits to authors.239 
Finally, the pretense of neutrality magnifies the stresses 
that new technologies place on the law in three ways. Structur-
ally, a technology-neutral statute is more prone to providing 
limited judicial guidance because legislators assume that mak-
ing the law technology neutral in name suffices to make the 
law adaptable to new technology. Practically, a technology-
neutral statute gives legislators the false impression that the 
law will not require legislative recalibration or reconsideration 
in response to new technology. And, administratively, the law 
might lack needed institutional tools for promoting tailored ad-
aptation and equivalence. Each is visible in the 1976 Act, which 
provides judges with little guidance for determining whether a 
new technology is equivalent to an old technology; creates the 
illusion of technology-specific amendments being unnecessary, 
from which Congress responded to emerging content-technology 
 
versies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision, 38 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109, 132–39 (2015) (discussing the uncertain implications 
of Aereo for “cloud storage, Slingboxes, ‘tablet TVs’ and live TV streaming”). 
 238. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 1217 (suggesting that technology neutrality may have been about tech-
nology entrenchment, basically ensuring that the incumbent distributors could 
remain powerful even when new, more efficient vehicles arose for disseminat-
ing content). 
 239. See Balganesh, supra note 46, at 1589–91. 
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conflicts with conflict-specific resolutions that did not consider 
the broader technological implications; and neglects to desig-
nate an institution for timely and tailored adjustments of copy-
right. 
III.  TOWARD TECHNOLOGICAL DISCRIMINATION   
The discussion in Part II illuminates unappreciated short-
comings of technology-neutral drafting generally and its im-
plementation in the 1976 Copyright Act specifically. The prob-
lem of prediction is unavoidable for laws governing technology-
dependent fields, often resulting in poor tailoring of laws to fu-
ture technologies—both known unknowns and, especially, un-
known unknowns. Similarly, the problem of the penumbra sug-
gests that courts will resist technology-neutral laws because as 
time passes and technology advances further into the unknown 
unknowns, it becomes less clear that the law should apply—
and that leads to uncertainty about how the law actually will 
apply. Additionally, judges either cannot or do not apply tech-
nology-neutral laws in an equivalent and consistent manner. 
The problem of perspective, though not unique to technology-
neutral laws, can cause more damage therein; when multiple 
possible perspectives exist, it leads to inconsistent judicial 
treatment of substantively similar technologies, as illustrated 
by Aereo and the peer-to-peer file-sharing cases, and thereby 
undermines the goal of equivalence. And the problem of pre-
tense causes technology-neutral provisions to be based on non-
neutral determinations favoring old technologies and business 
models. 
There are numerous possible alternatives to pure technolo-
gy neutrality. One, as Michael Birnhack notes, is to “replace a 
dichotomous approach with a series of continuums that form a 
complex legislative matrix.”240 And, in reality, laws typically are 
infused with both neutrality and specificity, at least conceptu-
ally. As discussed in Part II.D, even when technology neutrality 
is desirable and achievable, the law only is neutral in its treat-
ment of technologies that fit within specific criteria. Like with 
rules and standards, legal provisions fall on a spectrum of 
technology neutrality and specificity. This Part proffers that 
making copyright law more technology specific would better fa-
cilitate the goals of technology neutrality. It offers a proposal 
 
 240. Birnhack, supra note 136, at 36; see also Ohm, supra note 62, at 1687–
88. 
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that overtly abandons the pretense of neutrality and instead 
embraces the concept of technological discrimination. 
The claim is not that technology-neutral laws—that is, any 
law drawn to general technological characteristics—are fatally 
flawed. The four problems of technology neutrality appear to 
varying degrees in different types of laws—dependent on, inter 
alia, the field of law and the nature of the relevant technology-
neutral provision.241 Likewise, not all technology-specific laws 
promote policy goals. Copyright law’s pre-1978 experience with 
extreme technology specificity demonstrates the significance of 
the statutory and institutional context. 
Rather, laws should be more technology specific—that is, 
they should discriminate among technologies and technological 
classes in the furtherance of policy goals. This is what I call 
“domain-specific neutrality.” Within this rubric, a law might be 
drawn to “pens and pencils” or to “a handheld device, substan-
tively equivalent to a pen or pencil, for writing.” But the law 
would not be drawn to the poles of specificity and neutrality: 
e.g., “red ball-point pens” or “all technology, now known or later 
developed, capable of producing a writing that can be perceived 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” The de-
faults in copyright law, to this point, have been set at such ex-
tremes. Instead, copyright law should embrace technological 
discrimination: neutral treatment of all technologies that fit 
within a character-specific domain. 
Though technology specificity has long been criticized as 
prone to under-inclusiveness, antiquation, and obsolescence,242 
such failings are not inescapable features of technology-specific 
laws. They arise in certain contexts and can be mitigated by al-
ternative approaches to lawmaking and adjudication. The key 
to better technology-specific laws is congressional recognition 
that other institutions are needed to help adapt the law to 
technological change. Courts play an important but likely in-
complete role in technological discrimination; an agency proba-
bly would be necessary too. Courts need to take on a bigger role 
in determining whether copyright law applies, in the first in-
stance, to new technologies. That is, does copyright law regu-
late use of copyrighted works in the new technology? Addition-
ally, Congress could empower an administrative agency to 
issue clear and targeted rules for whether and how copyright 
 
 241. More on that, immediately below. 
 242. Cf. Moses, supra note 67, at 266–68; Sunstein, supra note 163, at 993. 
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law applies to new technologies.243 The agency also would be 
useful for setting compulsory license rates for technologies not 
subject to the copyright owner’s exclusive right.244  
Within this institutional lattice, discrimination can be 
normative by responding to the costs and benefits of specific 
technologies rather than being determined ex ante by technolo-
gy-neutral rules. This Part shows how technological discrimi-
nation, meted out by courts and an agency, could produce 
clearer outcomes in content-technology disputes while leaving 
less uncertainty about related technologies. It then makes the 
case for technological discrimination.  
A. ONE PROPOSAL 
Technological discrimination should be designed to avoid 
the unintended consequences of technology neutrality and to 
promote the general policy goals that motivate technology-
neutral laws. Better legislative drafting tools would promote 
statutory longevity and doctrinal equivalence, but only to the 
extent that doing so did not generate the phenomena that un-
dermine technology neutrality’s normativity.245 It also would 
enable non-legislative adaptation of the law to new technologies 
and would recognize when new technologies should be treated 
differently from old technologies. Such a system would foster 
technology neutrality’s goals only when those goals are, in fact, 
socially valuable; when not, it would adapt the law accordingly. 
My proposal advises moving copyright law away from its 
inadvertent technological mindset, shaped by old business 
models, of the distinct Section 106 exclusive rights;246 using 
narrower, but flexible, terms to define covered technologies, ra-
ther than the all-inclusive definitions currently in Section 
 
 243. This should not raise nondelegation doctrine concerns, as Congress 
would do the heavy lifting by defining the statutory categories and authorizing 
the agency to determine the specific technologies that fit within those catego-
ries, using both the technological standards and broadly defined policy princi-
ples that Congress includes in the statute. 
 244. That would be important for freeing technologists from potential hold-
up demands while also ensuring that authors still receive some compensation 
for technologies that the statute does not speak to. 
 245. Carys Craig argues that substantive technology neutrality—that is, 
applying the law so that it does not discriminate against or favor specific tech-
nologies—is socially beneficial, Craig, supra note 185, at 272–74, and I agree. 
But the 1976 Copyright Act, as drafted, does not allow for substantive technol-
ogy neutrality. Its statutory tools are too blunt and prospectively applicable. 
 246. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
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101;247 and adopting workable mechanisms for adapting copy-
right law to new technologies. How might this be operational-
ized? I offer the following hypothetical revision to copyright law 
for illustration; it is intentionally incomplete. 
My proposal begins with Congress replacing the technolo-
gy-neutral language of the exclusive rights and statutory defi-
nitions with something like this as a revised Section 106: 
Subject to limitations in Sections 107–122, the owner of a copyright 
under this title  has the exclusive right to economic exploitation of the 
copyrighted work in covered technologies. 
  Covered technologies are the following and those substantively 
equivalent: 
(1) Devices or systems, substantively equivalent to a video 
cassette recorder or camera, for recording audiovisual works; 
(2) Devices, substantively equivalent to broadcast or cable 
transmission, for communicating audiovisual works to the 
public; 
(3) . . . (15) 
(16) Devices, substantively equivalent to peer-to-peer net-
works, for sharing audiovisual works.  
(c) Copyright-using technologies not within 106(b) shall be subject to 
a compulsory licensing regime. 
Elsewhere in the statute, Congress would add technology-
specific provisions tailored to the unique social costs and bene-
fits of select technologies known at the time of the statute’s 
drafting. Cloud computing might be such a technology.248 As-
sume, for discussion below, that a cloud-specific provision ex-
empts cloud storage and transmission from copyright liability. 
Under this scheme, the statute would be technology neu-
tral with regard to the general default control copyright grants 
authors, but it would be more technology specific as to how 
those control rights apply to individual copyright-using tech-
nologies. This is similar to Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (WCT). In telling treaty members what copyright limi-
 
 247. Id. § 101. 
 248. See David Kravets, Analysis: Aereo’s Death Leaves Cloud Computing 
Hanging in the Balance, ARS TECHNICA (June 25, 2014, 4:36 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/analysis-aereos-death-leaves-cloud 
-computing-hanging-in-the-balance (“Experts disagree on whether the decision 
opens up a cloud-computing Pandora’s box.”); see also Am. Broad. Cos. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (“We cannot now answer more pre-
cisely how the Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will 
apply to technologies not before us. We agree with the Solicitor General that 
‘[q]uestions involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other nov-
el issues not before the Court, as to which Congress has not plainly marked 
[the] course, should await a case in which they are squarely presented.’”). 
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tations and exceptions they may permit, the WCT focuses on 
“certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploi-
tation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the author.”249 Note that WCT Article 10 does 
not mention the right of distribution or the right of rental or 
the right of communication to the public, nor the economic 
rights provided for by the Berne Convention (e.g., reproduction, 
translation, adaptation). The standard for limitations and ex-
ceptions is concerned only with the economic exploitation. 
The statute also would authorize an administrative agency 
to perform three supporting tasks: (1) clarify whether a new 
technology is subject to the proposed Section 106(b); (2) set li-
censing rates for copyright-using technologies not subject to the 
proposed Section 106(b); and (3) create statutory exceptions, as 
appropriate, for the same. With the burden on the party mov-
ing for a rulemaking, technologists likely would be motivated to 
either negotiate with copyright owners (under the expectation 
that the new technology will fit within the proposed Section 
106(b)) or to move for a rulemaking (based on a belief that the 
new technology should only be subject to a compulsory license). 
1. The Role of Courts 
Courts would factor prominently in adapting copyright law 
to new technologies. They would, effectively, broaden authors’ 
control over new markets as appropriate by determining 
whether a new technology was substantively equivalent to a 
covered technology.250 Such technological discrimination can be 
thought of as domain-specific neutrality—that is, neutral 
treatment of all technologies that fit within a domain bounded 
by certain characteristics and specifications. 
The linchpin of this process is the substance-over-form 
analysis by which a new technology is deemed to be similar to a 
covered technology. Though Congress, in the 1976 Act, evinced 
a concern over judicial formalism,251 judges had already become 
more comfortable with functional application of the law—with 
 
 249. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 64, art. 10(1), (2). 
 250. The analogizing would reference back both to statutorily enumerated 
technologies and technology types in the proposed Section 106(b) and also to 
case law that had already adapted copyright law to previous new technologies. 
 251. By indicating in the statute that all copyright-using technologies are 
functionally similar, Congress forced judges to be functionalists to the extreme 
of formalism. 
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adapting, by analogy, old laws to new technologies.252 It is not, 
for example, apparent that digitally compressed music would 
have been outside the copyright system absent the 1976 Act’s 
technology-neutral language, as courts applying the 1909 Act 
had moved away from the formalism of White-Smith Music.253 
Though these courts often insisted that a copyrighted work fit 
into one of the fourteen enumerated subject-matter categories 
for registration with the Copyright Office,254 courts shoehorned 
some new types of works into old authorship categories. In such 
cases, new wine did not actually need a new wineskin. 
A notable example is that of films, or, as they were then 
known, moving pictures. That old-fashioned term of art tells a 
great deal about the theory on which moving pictures were 
granted copyright protection. Section 5 of the 1909 Act made no 
mention of moving pictures (or any other applicable term) until 
1912;255 but lower courts had recognized the copyright of films 
since at least 1903.256 Considering courts’ adherence to only af-
fording copyright to works that could fit into Section 5, what 
explains this? Simply, courts became more comfortable with 
analogizing a new use or type of work to a statutorily enumer-
ated one. Under a judicial philosophy that looks beyond statu-
 
 252. Of course, there are exceptions, as evidenced by the Second Circuit 
majority in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). See su-
pra notes 189–206 and accompanying text. 
 253. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). White-
Smith Music was decided amid “formalism’s heyday.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW lv (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994). 
 254. Notwithstanding the express statement that Section 5 “shall not be 
held to limit the subject-matter of copyright as defined in section four,” which 
bounded copyrightability broadly as “all the writings of an author.” Copyright 
Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 4, 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (superseded by Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). 
 255. Townsend Amendment, Act of 1912, ch. 356, Pub. L. No. 62-303, § 5(l), 
37 Stat. 488; see also PATRY, supra note 106, § 1:47. 
 256. See, e.g., Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1909); 
Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242–43 (3d Cir. 1903). Similarly, judicial deci-
sions demonstrated a broad interpretation of a “book.” See, e.g., White-Smith 
Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 14; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BRIEFING 
PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES RAISED BY H.R. 2223, MAY 7, 1975, as reprinted in 
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong. 2053 (1975) (describing the exclusive rights provisions as 
“broad”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858 (1987) (“By the time Congress replaced the 1909 
Act, courts had embroidered the old statute with a wealth of common law in-
terpretation.”). 
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tory text to congressional intent, which became common prac-
tice in the early 1940s,257 digitally compressed music (and audi-
obooks) could have been analogized to musical compositions 
(and books or dramatic compositions) in the 1909 Act, even 
though they were not expressly mentioned and had distinct fea-
tures.258 Of course, a law that is neutral as to the form of copies 
provides greater certainty for copyright owners. But it is un-
clear that digitally compressed music needed technology neu-
trality to be covered by copyright. More critically, it needed a 
lack of legal formalism. 
Using an open-ended standard to define a technological 
domain (e.g., “equivalent to a pen or pencil” or “equivalent to a 
video cassette recorder or camera”) would help courts avoid 
formalism.259 Technology-specific standards would make the 
law more flexible by basing the law’s application on relevant 
characteristics, as assessed after the technology is known, ra-
ther than ex ante categorical inclusion.260 Such standards also 
would help promote equivalence by enabling judges to evaluate 
 
 257. Throughout the early twentieth century, jurists and legal theorists 
debated whether judges should look beyond a statute’s text and consider fac-
tors like legislative history. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States and Holy 
Trinity Church v. United States were two early bellwethers. 221 U.S. 1 (1911); 
143 U.S. 457 (1892). By the 1940s, judges became more concerned with har-
monizing statutory text and legislative purpose than with adhering to a law’s 
plain language—formalism gave way to purposivism. See William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmod-
ern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 711–23 (1991) (discussing Hart and 
Sacks’ influence on the shift); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 628 (1990) (noting recent opposition from 
some judges to the Supreme Court’s habit, throughout most of the twentieth 
century, of looking beyond the statutory text for “strongly contradictory legis-
lative history [that] can trump plain meaning”). However, in the past three 
decades, the textualist movement, led by Justice Scalia and Judge Easter-
brook, has provided a strong countercurrent to purposivism. See generally 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
30–36 (2006) (discussing the appeal of textualism and its impact). 
 258. Copyright Act of 1909 § 5(a), (d), (e). 
 259. Standards generally are favored in intellectual property law and pro-
vide judges with factors to guide the analysis of the law’s application. See, e.g., 
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29 (2001) (“[C]opyright rules are compli-
cated and hard to understand.”); Lee, supra note 139, at 1325–27 (discussing 
patent and copyright law’s reliance on standards); Merges, supra note 28, at 
2190 (“Discrete, problem-specific legislation is in fact quite common.”). 
Standards would not mandate per se application to all future technologies. Cf. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22, 58–59 (1992) (explaining the difference between rules and standards). 
 260. Cf. Dodson, supra note 164, at 15–16 (“A rule is a norm that is en-
forced according to its terms rather than the policies animating it. A standard, 
by contrast, is the attempt to enforce those policies more directly.”). 
Greenberg_5fmt  
2016] RETHINKING TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY 1553 
 
like technologies alike, and different technologies differently. 
Finally, technology-specific standards would acknowledge insti-
tutional shortcomings by delegating to courts overtly, rather 
than indirectly through use-specific exceptions. Moreover, 
technology-specific standards would better respond to technolo-
gy neutrality’s stickiest problems by limiting the degree of fore-
casting that legislators must do when passing the law and by 
improving the law’s targeting, thereby reducing both uniformi-
ty costs261 and the penumbra of uncertainty.262 
In dealing with a technology like Aereo, a court would be 
asked to first determine whether Aereo economically exploits a 
copyrighted work.263 Aereo’s business model, the thrust of which 
is to commercialize, without license, over-the-air transmissions 
of copyrighted content, seems to be clearly within the meaning 
of economic exploitation.264 Next, a court would have to deter-
mine whether Aereo was substantively equivalent to a covered 
technology; if not, then proceed to the agency for compulsory li-
cense rate-setting.265 The result would likely be the same as 
that reached by the Supreme Court in June: Aereo is like a ca-
ble system, and therefore it is liable for infringing the broad-
casters’ copyrights.266 Yet, as we will see shortly, an approach 
that discriminates among technologies would provide a clearer 
answer on the issue of cloud computing. 
2. The Role of an Agency 
The agency role would be to clarify inconsistent application 
of copyright law to new technologies and to help adapt copy-
right law to new technologies by determining when new tech-
nologies deserve special treatment under existing law. The 
agency would do so by engaging in rulemakings to determine 
both the technologies that are of the kind that Congress sought 
to reach with copyright law and the technologies that might be, 
based on certain characteristics, but otherwise warrant favored 
 
 261. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Costs in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 890–91 (2006) (addressing 
the reduction of uniformity costs by use of standards versus rules). 
 262. See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 992–96 (emphasizing the confusion 
that can result from poorly written rules). 
 263. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2012). 
 264. See Steel, supra note 43 (mentioning the decline of Aereo’s business 
model after the Supreme Court “essentially shredded” it in June). 
 265. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 25 (listing some covered tech-
nologies). 
 266. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
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or disfavored treatment. The agency also would set compulsory 
license rates for those technologies that fell outside an author-
ship exclusive control right. 
To be sure, an agency would end up spending time develop-
ing rules for soon-to-be-outmoded or commercially unrealized 
technologies, like digital audio tapes.267 But this concern is even 
sharper with Congress, which moves more slowly and at a 
higher cost.268 With courts, presumably more valuable technolo-
gies will be those that are litigated and gain market traction. 
Yet, courts are not singular, and common law rules develop 
over time; legal delay will often be even longer with courts than 
an agency.269 
The agency would be best suited for addressing new tech-
nologies that fit into the known unknowns discussed in Part 
II.A. However, for paradigm-shifting technologies (i.e., the un-
known unknowns), the agency’s authority likely should be more 
circumscribed; the agency would determine whether it has ju-
risdiction over the new technology or whether that technology 
diverges too much from those technologies that Congress de-
signed copyright law to reach. This, practically, would create a 
technological sunset for copyright law, forcing Congress to up-
date the law in response to technologies that not only were un-
foreseen but also disrupt underlying principles.270 
Returning to Aereo and the cloud, what role would the 
agency play? First, before the Aereo litigation ran its course, 
the agency could issue a rulemaking regarding whether Aereo 
and similar technologies are subject to the proposed Section 
106(b). If the agency ruled that Aereo was substantively equiv-
alent to a covered technology and did not warrant an exception, 
then Aereo would be subject to full copyright liability and 
would be required to negotiate with copyright owners to obtain 
a license.271 If the agency ruled that Aereo is not a covered 
 
 267. See Liu, supra note 120, at 157–58 (discussing the rate of technologi-
cal change and the need for policy to keep up). 
 268. See James J. Florio, Congress As Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous 
Waste Policy in the 1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 376 (1986) (“Congress acts 
only when driven by exogenous political forces to act.”). 
 269. See id. at 359 (“Normal bureaucratic delay and delay resulting from 
initiating a regulatory program are far different, however, from a conscious 
political decision by the executive branch to avoid the implementation of a 
law.”). 
 270. Cf. Ohm, supra note 62, at 1710–13 (explaining how technology-
specific rules in surveillance law act as technology sunsets). 
 271. See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 21, at 12 (“A property right is 
a legally enforceable power to exclude others from using a resource . . . .”). 
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technology, then Aereo would be able to continue exploiting the 
broadcasters’ copyrighted works without a negotiated license, 
but would be subject to the compulsory rate set for Aereo and 
similar technologies.272 Neither rulemaking would affect cloud 
storage and transmission because of the explicit exemption 
added elsewhere in the statute.273 But what if cloud computing 
was developed after the statute’s enactment, and thus no ex-
press exemption existed? In that case, the agency, based on 
congressionally defined principles of copyright and innovation 
policy, could create the exemption. Either way, the concerns for 
cloud computing, though prominent in the amici urging the Su-
preme Court to cabin any decision finding Aereo liable for copy-
right infringement under the current copyright system,274 are 
absent in this new framework. 
B. THE CASE FOR DISCRIMINATION 
Moving copyright law toward greater technological dis-
crimination would not be cost-free. To begin, rulemaking and 
rate-setting would impose a heavier administrative burden 
than technology neutrality.275 Time and energy would, at times, 
be invested in crafting rules for new, but quickly obsolete, 
technologies.276 The earlier discussion regarding digital audio 
tapes is illustrative,277 and the unpredictable nature of innova-
tion is informative.278 Some new technologies would garner 
more attention than their short technological lives deserve. 
Rate-setting also can be a contentious and laborious process, as 
demonstrated by the decade-plus process of calibrating a 
 
 272. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 274. See, e.g., Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Profes-
sors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1509 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348474; Brief of Computer & 
Communications Industry Association and Mozilla Corporation as Amici Curi-
ae Supporting Respondent, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 1509 (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 
1319386.  
 275. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, 
and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1351 (2010) (introducing the 
administrative burden of processing information). 
 276. But see LESSIG, supra note 28, at 3 (“[T]he law adjusts to the technolo-
gies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes.”). 
 277. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; cf. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON FAIR USE, § 9:34, Westlaw (database updated May 2015) (discussing 
the history of semiconductor computer chip design bills and noting that only 
one reported case has been brought under the Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act of 1984).  
 278. See supra notes 124–42.  
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webcasting royalty.279 Additionally, agencies are susceptible to 
regulatory capture by interested parties.280 In particular, 
“stakeholders with privileged access to information and to 
agency input channels” are able to shape substantive law to 
their benefit.281 These challenges likely would be present in us-
ing an agency to adapt copyright law to new technologies. 
Yet, copyright law long has been defined by legislative cap-
ture.282 The negotiation process, by which authors and content 
industries have agreed to statutory revisions, favors a subset of 
stakeholders, namely authors and the content industries; users 
typically have not had the same seat at the table.283 Though 
regulatory capture is a real concern, it may be less problematic 
than the way copyright law long has been shaped. And, in fact, 
with the emergence of a technology lobby that often opposes the 
interests of the content lobby, delegating to an agency could be 
more efficient.284 An agency also could bring important exper-
tise to the table.285 As Joseph Liu has argued, an agency at least 
 
 279. See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 
1926; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974; 
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 
118 Stat. 2341; Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 
116 Stat. 2780; see also DiCola & Sag, supra note 32, at 224–38. 
 280. Wagner, supra note 275, at 1326 (“Administrative law, by contrast, 
imposes almost no filtering requirements or incentives on any of the partici-
pants who engage in the rulemaking and instead produces strong incentives 
for precisely the opposite behavior at key points in the process.”). 
 281. Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Proper-
ty Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 981 (2014); 
David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 335 
(2014) (“Classic views of regulatory capture consider the phenomenon to be 
normatively undesirable as disruptive of both democratic legitimacy and insti-
tutional accountability in the administrative state.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 282. See LESSIG, supra note 28, at 261 (“They adopt a rational strategy in 
an irrational context . . . . And that rational strategy thus becomes framed in 
terms of this ideal—the sanctity of an idea called ‘intellectual property.’”). See 
generally Litman, supra note 256, at 857–62 (discussing the legislative history 
of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 283. See Litman, supra note 256, at 867 (stating which actors typically had 
a seat at the negotiating table). 
 284. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 195 (2002) (“Political economists characterize this 
‘conflictual demand pattern’ for new legislation as conducive to an outcome in 
which Congress delegates resolution of the problem to a regulatory agency.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 285. See Thaw, supra note 281, at 370–74 (arguing that regulatory capture, 
when it provides a vehicle for private expertise, can actually advance the pub-
lic interest). 
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would help “ensure that a wide range of stakeholders has real 
access to the policymakers.”286 
Moreover, numerous advantages to technological discrimi-
nation outweigh these disadvantages. First, technological dis-
crimination can improve copyright law’s tailoring and thereby 
reduce its over- and under-inclusiveness.287 Technology-neutral 
copyright imposes restrictions on new technologies when doing 
so is unnecessary for spurring creative expression; conversely, 
for costly works enabled by new technologies, neutrality might 
provide insufficient incentives. This is a consequence of copy-
right’s uniformity costs—those social costs resulting from, as 
Mike Carroll has explained, rights “that are more or less robust 
than necessary to have induced investments in innovation that 
deliver a net benefit to society.”288 Technology specificity, in con-
trast, facilitates greater tailoring of the law.289 A copyright 
owner’s control over a new technological market could be teth-
ered to the potential effect of that new market on the copyright 
owner’s existing market and balanced against the social value 
of the new technology. In other words, the law could be cali-
brated to regulate a new technology in proportion to the tech-
nology’s cost to author control over economic exploitation. 
Moreover, agencies have investigative tools that courts lack, 
enabling agencies to look at issues beyond those presented by 
parties to litigation, and are authorized to engage in policymak-
ing—“to weigh costs and benefits . . . and come to judgments 
about competing notions of what is likely to be good for socie-
ty.”290 
Second, and relatedly, an agency reduces legal uncertainty 
and delay both by streamlining the process of updating the 
law291 and unifying rulemaking in a central body.292 Congress, 
 
 286. Liu, supra note 120, at 158. 
 287. Cf. Chafee, supra note 79, at 517–19 (discussing the normative value 
of tailoring copyright law to industry- and use-specific economic considera-
tions). 
 288. Carroll, supra note 261, at 849–50. 
 289. Cf. Lionel Bently, Copyright and the Victorian Internet: Telegraphic 
Property Laws in Colonial Australia, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 175 (2004) (dis-
cussing the value of technology specificity in response to issues raised by elec-
tric telegraphic dissemination of news in 1870s Australia). 
 290. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 
1788 (2011). 
 291. Though Congress theoretically could update copyright law more often, 
practically frequent revisions are best accomplished by an administrative 
agency. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at 1635–36 (discussing the admin-
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by empowering an agency, would avoid the pitfalls of locking 
the law in place for decades without deliberately tailoring it to 
technology that did not exist at the time the law was passed.293 
The law would not be future-proofed in the sense that it need 
not be updated, but would adapt to the future via built-in 
mechanisms for flexibly responding to technological change,294 
and more quickly than could occur through Congress.295 
Third, discrimination avoids treating substantive techno-
logical differences, rather than just mechanical variations, the 
same. It helps the law focus on substantive equivalence and 
guards against mistaking equal application for equivalence. 
This is, after all, the “unprecedented power of technology neu-
trality”296—but its execution is severely hampered by the ex-
treme technology neutrality of the 1976 Copyright Act. For ex-
ample, a technology-specific law could recognize the 
substantive differences between cable and Aereo, between 
Aereo and cloud computing, and between cable and cloud com-
puting. Recognizing when different technologies warrant differ-
ent legal treatment avoids discriminating against new technol-
ogies in favor of old technologies and old business models. 
Conversely, granting copyright owners the same control over 
 
istrative costs of Congress enacting patent statutes specific to numerous tech-
nological industries). 
 292. An agency’s interpretation of a rule would bind the courts and could 
resolve circuit splits. See Moses, supra note 67, at 278; Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580, 2588 (2006). 
 293. See Pallante, supra note 12, at 341 (arguing that the Copyright Of-
fice’s historical lack of much regulatory authority has led “Congress to write 
too much detail into the code on matters that are constantly changing, such as 
economic conditions and technology”). 
 294. There are many costs and benefits of an agency approach that are not 
related to technological change. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: 
HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 30–31 (3d ed. 
2003) (engaging in a discussion about the source of agency power and how that 
influences its effectiveness). 
 295. See Depoorter, supra note 28, at 1865–67; Liu, supra note 120, at 156–
57; Menell, supra note 284, at 195–97; see also Florio, supra note 268, at 381 
(“[T]he staff and flexibility of an administrative agency are valuable in tailor-
ing regulations to respond to individual situations.”). 
 296. Craig, supra note 185, at 299 (“The unprecedented power of technolog-
ical neutrality to shape the contours of copyright protection therefore depends 
on an understanding of the principle that extends beyond simple non-
discrimination in the application of copyright norms to new media. Rather, its 
power flows from a substantive commitment to the notion that copyright law 
should apply with equivalent purpose and effect across the technological land-
scape.”). 
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seen and unforeseen technologies is socially costly because, as 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued, copyright owners “clear-
ly are not best positioned to develop” new markets, and this can 
“facilitate a potential holdout, raising the transaction costs for 
developers of new media and devices and stifling innovation in 
the process.”297 It also helps curb efforts at legal avoision by in-
structing courts to analogize new technology to substantively 
equivalent covered technologies; the broadly defined, general 
exclusive right moreover helps curtail efforts to exploit a legal 
gap between distinct exclusive rights. 
Finally, and maybe most significantly, employing techno-
logical discrimination could better promote innovation, by lim-
iting copyright liability for some new technologies, while also 
protecting authors against depletion of the value of their copy-
rights.298 This proposal shifts copyright law’s defaults for 
uniquely unpredictable technologies to a compulsory license re-
gime, moving away from the current default of copyright liabil-
ity but without swinging all the way to the White-Smith Music 
model of free use.299 Coupled with increased tailoring, techno-
logical discrimination would help copyright law provide incen-
tives for authors and facilitate innovation as a default, without 
relying so heavily on ad hoc fair use determinations. 
 
 
 297. Balganesh, supra note 46, at 1590–91. 
 298. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
442 (1984) (opining that the law “must strike a balance between a copyright 
holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of 
the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce”); SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 82, 
13–14 (“A real danger to be guarded against is that of confining the scope of an 
author’s rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the years go 
by, his copyright loses much of its value because of unforeseen technical ad-
vances. For these reasons, we believe that the author’s rights should be stated 
in the statute in broad terms . . . .”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 48, at 1350 
(“Optimal digital copyright policy with respect to p2p networks would do two 
things: deter technological innovators as little as possible and permit cost-
effective enforcement of copyright in the digital environment.”). 
 299. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1908); 
cf. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 151 (2008) (“As crafted 
by Congress or the courts, the compulsory licenses aim to maintain copyright 
law’s economic incentives to create and disseminate new expression. But . . . 
by freeing new technological distributors from incumbents’ vertical restraints, 
the compulsory licenses have created alternative outlets for independent 
speakers and helped to foster expressive diversity.”). 
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  CONCLUSION: BEYOND COPYRIGHT   
As Congress continues reviewing copyright law for possibly 
its fifth major overhaul, it should look beyond the functioning 
of individual provisions—e.g., Are statutory damages as set by 
Section 504 too variable and at times disproportionate? Are the 
music statutory licenses working for copyright owners and us-
ers?—to the “unifying theme”300 of the 1976 Act: that the de-
fault provisions dictate applying the law to new technologies 
just as it was applied to old technologies. The past four decades 
have demonstrated that technology neutrality is no panacea for 
the typical ailments of statutory aging. If Congress wants to 
promote the longevity of “The Next Great Copyright Act,” it 
should rethink the fundamental language of the exclusive 
rights, copyrightable subject matter, and statutory definitions. 
And it should give clearer roles for other institutions to help 
tailor copyright law to new technologies. 
Moreover, Congress should not confine this rethinking to 
the Copyright Act. Though this Article has used copyright law 
as an analytic lens for recasting technology neutrality, technol-
ogy neutrality infuses legal regimes as varied as those of gov-
erning surveillance,301 telecommunications,302 patents,303 and 
electronic signatures.304 Because the problems discussed are in-
herent to technology neutrality, and not the result of its im-
plementation in copyright, they appear in other technology-
neutral laws, though in varying degrees. It is, thus, worth con-
sidering the implications of this conceptual rethinking beyond 
copyright. This Article concludes with a brief discussion of pa-
tent law. 
Like copyright, patent law is by default technology neu-
tral.305 Patentability and infringement generally are deter-
mined based on broadly applicable legal rules and standards, 
 
 300. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 79, § 12A.16[B]. 
 301. See, e.g., Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
 302. See Reed, supra note 62, at 264 (“[T]echnology neutrality has contin-
ued to be a pervasive concept in that field, influencing among others the de-
bates on convergence with broadcasting, voice over IP, universal service, spec-
trum allocation and net neutrality.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 303. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–212 (2012). 
 304. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
(ESIGN), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–7021 (2012).  
 305. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at 1577 (questioning whether 
patent law is technology-neutral in its application). 
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with the statute rarely technology specific.306 Yet, though pa-
tent law’s provisions “are designed to adapt flexibly to new 
technologies, encompassing ‘anything under the sun made by 
man,’”307 courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) have been engaged in a decades-long process of making 
patent law technology-specific.308 The PTO, for example, has 
technology-specific obviousness guidelines for patent examin-
ers.309 This process has occurred largely haphazardly, resulting 
in poor tailoring and incidental technology specificity.310 
However, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley proffer that it is 
best to keep patent law technology neutral—“that we should 
not jettison our nominally uniform patent system in favor of 
specific statutes that protect particular industries”311—because 
courts can employ policy levers to better tailor patent law 
whereas industry-specific legislation would be susceptible to 
“rent-seeking” and obsolescence.312 It could be that courts alone 
are best suited to tailoring patent law. But it does not follow 
that technology neutrality is automatically better than specific-
ity simply because Congress is an inefficient vehicle for adapt-
ing patent law to new technologies or technological classes. 
Technology neutrality’s limitations in patent can be seen in 
the battle over business method313 and software patents.314 Pa-
tent law, like copyright, is about providing incentives, with the 
theoretical justification even more utilitarian.315 And it is possi-
 
 306. See supra note 259. 
 307. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 308. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at 1630–38 (exploring 
the development of industry-specific patent laws). 
 309. See Examination Guidelines & Training Materials in view of KSR In-
ternational Co. v. Teleflex Inc., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www 
.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/examination 
-guidelines-training-materials-view-ksr (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 
 310. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 121, at 1595. 
 311. Id. at 1579. 
 312. Id. at 1634–37. 
 313. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). For further discussion 
of the “post-Bilski” confusion, see generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After 
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). 
 314. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see also 
Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle In-
nings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (2007); Adam Mossoff, A Brief History of Software 
Patents (and Why They’re Valid), 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 65 (2014). 
 315. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation 
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ble that patent law’s broad, technology-neutral rules, by allow-
ing certain technological classes into the patent system or 
granting different technologies the same rights, are actually 
discouraging innovation more than they are incentivizing it.316 
If that is the case—and many scholars (myself included) argue 
that it has been with software patents317—then it would seem 
that technology-specific defaults would augment patent tailor-
ing. 
When legal regimes adopt technology neutrality as a gen-
eral principle, it leads to rules that are over-inclusive and 
speak poorly to unforeseen technologies. This makes technology 
neutrality socially undesirable. It also, in turn, results in in-
consistent treatment of similar technologies and increases un-
certainty about whether and how the law will be or should be 
applied. And that undermines neutrality’s goals of promoting 
statutory longevity and adapting the law to new technologies. 
Copyright law offers a powerful illustration, but it is only one of 
many technology-neutral laws that fall short of policy goals. 
And it is likely that many other areas of the law could benefit 
from technological discrimination. 
 
 
of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the progress of 
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 316. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 65, 113–18 (2015). 
 317. See Brief of Law, Business, & Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 8–10, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 
2014 WL 880952, at *8–10; see also James Bessen, A Generation of Software 
Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 241, 255 (2012) (asking whether software 
firms now get more patents); Brian J. Love, No: Software Patents Don’t Spur 
Innovation, but Impede It, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2013, at R2. But see David J. 
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